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Professor Krasnowiecki's article offers a penetrating
analysis of the legal aspects of planned unit development. His
discussion of statutory law, the courts, and the neighboring
challenger reveals the inherent defects and inconsistencies
of a system which draws sharp distinctions between the legislative and administrative function and sees planning as an
instrument for protecting private property interests. Professor Krasnowiecki also addresses himself to the local restrictions that are necessary to balance the existing interests
of the land owners and the municipality against the potential
benefits of planned unit development. His suggested solutions, such as the use of a floating open space easement, are
refreshingly imaginative and eminently practical.
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT: A CHALLENGE
TO ESTABLISHED THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF LAND USE CONTROL
JAN Z. KRASNOWIECKI t
Introduction'
We have, I believe, become convinced that existing zoning, subdivision and other development controls have failed to encourage, and
in fact have directly discouraged, a more imaginative product, particularly in new residential development. The existing controls, it is
often noted, tend to focus on the individual lot, a focus which makes
sense where development occurs on an individual lot basis but which
offers the residential developer nothing better than a "cookie cutter"
with which to create a community. Current subdivision controls, for
example, assume that the entire site (excepting streets and drainage
rights of way) will be distributed in lots for the individual enjoyment
of each home. In fact, however, the lots are frequently used in
common by the children and sometimes even by the adults. It may2
be appropriate to ask why we do not allow the developer to borrow
a part of each lot and assemble some areas for common use and
recreation from the start.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. M.A., B.C.L. Oxford, LL.M.
Harvard University. Member, Illinois Bar.
1 In preparing this article, I have benefited by the experience gathered during
the course of a study sponsored jointly by the National Association of Home Builders
and the Urban Land Institute. The results of that study have been published under
the title: UrbAN LAND INsTITUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. 52, 1965) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL AsPEcTs OF PLANNED
UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEMOPMENT].
2

By using the word "borrow" here, I do not intend to encourage the view that
the lot reductions should be related to open space on a one for one basis. See text
-,
at pp. 80-81 infra.
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There is much to be gained by a fresh approach. By recognizing
the need for common recreation, the homes can be designed and sited
for greater privacy and the home owner need not be put to the choice
between suffering daily invasion or becoming an outcast. The ability
to use a portion of the entire site as common open space will give the
developer "play" in the siting of his homes so that if he is forced to
use one design he can cluster them around cul-de-sacs instead of stringing them out like matchboxes in a row. If we abandon the idea that
the automobile must have access to the lot and allow the developer to
use interior lots, walkways and common parking facilities, a whole
range of interesting site planning possibilities would become available.
From here, why not escape the matchbox effect entirely, by encouraging
the developer to use a combination of different housing types? By
adding neighborhood stores, the variety and convenience which makes
for an interesting community might be supplied.
These are some of the ideas associated with the current movement
in favor of "cluster" and "planned unit" residential development.' They
are not new ideas. Contrary to popular belief, the draftsmen of the
original model enabling legislation did not overlook the project approach to residential development. Indeed, in 1925, Bassett and others
prepared a model planning law which included, in Section 12, a provision for planned unit residential development.4
Section 12 of the law was enacted in New York and its procedure
has been available at every level of local government, without interruption, since 1927. Yet, so far as I know, it was not employed by
any New York municipality until 1960 and, when challenged in court,
it was misinterpreted and virtually held unconstitutional.5 I shall
speak of these developments in greater detail later.
The fact that section 12 remained unused for over thirty years
suggests that there was some resistance to it on the part of local
authorities. Undoubtedly there was a lack of interest on the part of
developers. This may have been due to unfamiliarity with this form
of development or uncertainty about the market reactions to it. Perhaps there was something about the law that made it impractical or
risky from the developer's point of view.
3 FHA, PLANNED-UNIT DEVELOPMENT WITH A HOMES ASSOCIATION (Land Planning Bull. No. 6, 1963); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK

(Tech. Bull. 50, 1964); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, INNOVATIONS VS. TRADITIONS IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. 47, 1963); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, Nmv
APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT (Tech.

Bull. 40, 1961);

WHYTE,

CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT (1964).
4 See 7 REGIONAL SURVEY OF NEW YORK AND ITS ENVIRONS, LAWS OF PLANNING

UNBUILT AREAS Part I, 272-73, 309-12 (1929).
5 See text accompanying notes 80-84 infra.
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Today, there is certainly no lack of interest on the part of developersthough there may still be some uncertainty about market reactions.6
It is not the function of lawyers to determine how the market will respond; that has to be left to the developer. But if there is something
about the law that makes it impractical or unduly risky for the builder
to undertake this form of development-that is our province. In discussing what is wrong with the present system of zoning and subdivision control and how it should be modified to encourage better
forms of residential development, it is possible to forget that the job
has to be done by developers. If a better development is to be encouraged, the controls devised will have to be sensitive to the developer's needs. It is from this point of view that I want to consider
the topic.
An illustration may be helpful: A developer is planning a
residential development on a sixty acre tract. He has bought twenty
acres outright and has obtained favorable options on the other forty
acres from two different owners. The land is zoned single family
detached for a minimum lot size of 30,000 square feet. The zoning
ordinance, however, contains a "cluster" provision which allows reductions in lot size down to 20,000 square feet provided that the number of dwelling units placed on the entire site does not exceed the
number that would have been placed if the minimum of 30,000 square
feet had been adhered to. The balance of the site, exclusive of streets,
is to be placed in common open space.
Under the standard subdivision procedure, the developer may
file a preliminary plan for the entire sixty acre tract and may be permitted to proceed to the filing and approval of a final subdivision plat
by sections. If he decides to proceed with a standard development at
30,000 square feet minimum lot size, the developer is certain that he
will be allowed to proceed to final platting and subdivision approval
by sections of twenty acres each.
To obtain final approval, the developer must make detailed engineering studies, prepare a detailed site plan, and immediately improve
or furnish bonds for certain public improvements within the area
covered by the final plan. Normally, he is not required to bond public
improvements that will be added in subsequent sections.
If he decides to use a standard development he will inevitably decide to proceed by sections. The average developer simply cannot
afford to freeze capital in a project for more than a year or two. We
can assume that the case law permits the local authority to change all
6 See authorities cited note 3 sispra. See also National Ass'n of Home Builders,
Journal of Homebuilding, July 1964, pp. 49-59 (editorial comments), for an indication
that market reaction would be favorable.
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of the requirements even after final approval unless the developer has
progressed substantially to the completion of the development. 7 There
is, therefore, little advantage in filing a final subdivision plan for the
whole sixty acre tract. Frequently, there are substantial disadvantages.
For example, in our case there may be the cost of exercising the options
earlier than necessary, as well as the cost of detailed engineering studies,
improvements and bonds.
Now suppose that the "cluster" alternative is applicable to developments of sixty acres or more, but that the ordinance requires
the developer who chooses this alternative to file a final subdivision
plan for the entire sixty acres. The alternative has lost its attraction
so far as this or most other developers are concerned.
The cluster technique may save the developer some expense on
street frontage and utility lines,' but he has some added costs. If the
job is to be done well, he must engage an experienced site planner.
In addition, he must select a plan for the ownership and maintenance
of the common properties. The best choice is the homes association,'
but establishing one involves legal expenses as well as the developer's
time in supervising and coaching the homeowners who will run the
association. If there is also a requirement that the developer proceed
at once to obtain final approval for the entire sixty acre development,
the savings of a planned unit may not offset the additional costs.
In order to discourage the developer, it is not necessary that the
local ordinance provide that he must finally plat the entire development.
It may be sufficient if the ordinance requires him to set aside the entire
open space area as soon as he begins development. If, given the
topography and other factors, the best site plan would call for one
open space 'area in a central location, it is easy to understand why the
local authority might insist that the developer set aside the entire open
area before proceeding with the first section of the development.
Under any other procedure a meaningful area would have to be put
together in snippets, and there is no assurance that the developer
would proceed to subsequent sections.
If the developer owns the entire sixty acre tract, he might not
object to setting aside the entire open space area from the start. But
there are two discouraging considerations. Any open space which is
definitely located on the face of a subdivision plat recorded with the
first section or in the accompanying documents (as, for example, in a
declaration of covenants) may be permanently frozen in a given loca7 See notes 128-31 infra and accompanying text
8 See UBAN LAND INSTITUTE, INNOVATIONs VS. TRADITIONS IN COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT 24-26, 93-95 (Tech. Bull. 47, 1963).
9 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, HOMES AssOcIATION HANDBOOK (Tech. Bull. 50, 1964).
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tion because of the case law which holds that individual lot purchasers
acquire an implied easement over any areas so located.' It may become
difficult to modify the site plan for subsequent sections if the open space
area has to remain where it was initially placed. Even this may
concern the developer less than the thought that, under the existing
law in most jurisdictions, the local public authority is free to change
all of the requirements applicable to the future sections." Having
committed all of the open space area to common use from the start,
the developer may find that a change in requirements on subsequent
sections (for example, increase in minimum lot size to 40,000 square
feet) has destroyed his financial calculations. Had he traveled the
standard development route, he would have developed the first twenty
acres at a minimum lot size of 30,000 square feet without setting aside
any of the remaining portion of the tract as open space. If a change
had then occurred in the regulations applicable to the remaining portion
of the tract, he would have had the alternatives of stopping development
or going on to a 40,000 square foot minimum, but now he is caught
with dedicated open space and a change in the minimum.
In our illustration we have assumed that the best site plan calls
for a single open space area roughly in the middle of the tract. It may
be that the best arrangement would call for three smaller open areas,
one in each of the three sections of development. But this suggests
another thought. Under the present system, is there not a marked
tendency to force a distribution of open space that responds more to
the developer's need for section by section development than it does
to good site planning? 12
My illustration may overstate the factors that trouble the simple
cluster approach, which does not depart from a single housing type
and involves merely a stated reduction of lot size against an offsetting
reservation of open space. But the same factors are present in the
more ambitious planned unit development, which may combine a
variety of housing types and accessory commercial uses. Here one
10 See notes 110-11 and accompanying text infra. The cases that imply an easement in favor of the lot or home purchaser rest on equitable considerations which
recognize that the average lot or home purchaser is not sufficiently informed to protect
himself by demanding an express easement. Therefore, it is doubtful that an express
disclaimer by the developer in the deeds or on the face of the plat will be given effect

by the courts.

11 See text accompanying notes 124-30 infra.
12 Some ideas for the solution of this problem are discussed in the text accompanying notes 113-15 infra. There are other problems connected with the location
of open space. For example, suppose title to the sixty acre tract has been assembled
in such a manner that there are three secured interests involved, each having a stake
in a different portion of the tract. Who will determine the location of the open space?
If there is only one secured interest for the whole tract, will the local authority accept
a procedure under which where seventy homes are planned one seventieth of the
planned open area will be released with each home sold?
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cannot dismiss the problems as trivial. Not only will the dual role
of open space-as an amenity related to the entire project, and as a
method of control of density-become more difficult to handle, but a
whole new set of relationships will have been added to increase the
unit characteristics of the project.
For such an ambitious project the developer's initial expenditures
on site planning, design, engineering, and legal services will be substantial. To justify such expenditures, the developer may have to
begin with the higher density housing types first or else a large portion
of his capital may remain frozen in the project too long. Different
housing types represent different potential densities. If the developer
is required to preserve within each stage the density which is prescribed for the project as a whole, the location of the open space will
tend to be governed by the density characteristics of each housing type
rather than by what makes sense for the project as a whole.
On the other hand, to have housing go up in one place and to
have offsetting open space located in another raises questions as to
what will happen if development is discontinued for any reason.
Moreover, certain housing types may be acceptable only as they relate
to the whole project, and the thought that discontinuance of the project
would leave them on their own may be thoroughly objectionable to
the local public authority. A solution to this problem would be to
require the developer to begin with that portion of the project which
would be acceptable on its own. However, if the acceptable section
would not furnish the developer with adequate compensation for the
initial expenditures or the added risks of such a project, planned unit
residential development will be discouraged.13 In short, a sound program for encouraging better development must respond to this formula:
For every increase in the initial expenditures and for every extension
of the time that any expenditures remain frozen in the project, there
must be a corresponding reduction in risk or an increase in the potential profit as compared with standard development. The two elements
of the formula that can be directly affected by the planning controls
are: (1) the timing of the expenditures, and (2) the risk.
Under present subdivision control laws, a great many expenditures are tied to a single event in the process of development: the
approval and recordation of a final subdivision plat. 4 Instead, why
13 These questions are further considered in the text accompanying notes 115-21
iflfra.
14
The following enabling legislation contains language which makes the bonding
or actual construction of all subdivision improvements a mandatory condition of final
plat approval: HAWII
Rzv. LAws §§ 147-52 (1957) (county); HAWAIi REV. LAWS
§§ 147-87 (1957) (city planning commission) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13-1111 (1964)
(first class cities) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2918 (1964) (county) ; MO. STAT.
ANN. § 64.060 (1949) (class one counties) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 64.580 (Supp. 1962)
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can't expenditures for streets, utility lines, and sewers (sanitary and
drainage) be related more closely to the time when they are actually
needed? "5

Why must we guard jealously the right of government to change
its mind after it has approved a plan of development? Nobody can
quarrel with the need to guard against a clear threat to health or
safety, but we allow changes solely in the name of a nebulous idea of
"public welfare." If a better form of residential development is discouraged, one may doubt whether the public welfare has actually
been served. Perhaps, in this instance we ought to abandon the old
saw that "men must turn square corners when they deal with the
Government."

16

Considering the manner in which planning controls affect the
costs and risks of development, leads one to some additional questions,
perhaps even more significant than those already mentioned. Is the
developer required to secure the approval of more local agencies in
completing a planned residential development than he is in building a
standard development? More importantly, is he exposed to several
public hearings when in standard development he can get by with one?
Anyone who has witnessed a public hearing will readily testify that it
7
is an experience which a normal developer would rather not repeat.'
When the developer has obtained the local approvals, what are
the chances that a court will invalidate them at the instance of neigh(county and township); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22770 (1957) (second Class
cities); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 58066(c) (1957) (first class townships); PA.
5
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 662 6(c) (1957) (second class townships); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 525o-25s (1961)
(municipalities).
With the exception of the provisions
listed, the enabling statutes are couched in permissive terms (i.e., the wording frequently is that the local public authority "may" require that certain subdivision
improvements be made or bonded prior to trial plat approval). Despite this language,
it is often difficult to persuade the local authorities that they are free to postpone the
bonding. Express authority to defer the construction or bonding of subdivision
improvements is found only in Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.10.1 (Page Supp.
1964). A recent amendment of the New York laws may operate to the same effect:
N.Y. TowN LAw §§ 276(3), 277(1); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 179-k, -1. (The planning board may give final approval to a plat and, concurrently, may permit the
developer to file the approved plat in sections. The amended law authorizes the board
to give the entire plat final approval upon the installation or bonding of improvements
within the first section filed.)
15 From the public point of view, of course, the larger are the developer's early
expenditures on the project the greater his commitment to completion. See discussion
at pp. 91-93 infra.
10Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947), quoting Rock
Island, A. & L.R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
See generally
Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680 (1954) ; Newman,
Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposalsas to Estoppel and Related Doctrines
in Administrative Law, 53 COLU . L. REv. 374 (1953).
17 Most developers will spend several days in preparation for a hearing on a
substantial project, and few will attend without an attorney, site planner, engineer
and other professional consultants. The cost of any one hearing is frequently quite
considerable, both in time spent and in actual cash outlay. Nor is the hearing itself
a particularly pleasant experience, since public attendance is drawn largely from
those who oppose the project.
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boring residents in the community? This is a question that has been
given frequent consideration but without attention to an important
distinction. For example, when the future of "flexible" controls is
discussed, it is commonly assumed that all changes which relax the
controls applicable to one property must be subject to review at the
instance of the owners of some other property. When the question of
review is considered, whether it be as to scope or proper forum, no
distinction is made between an owner's challenge to planning action
that tightens (or fails to relax) the controls on his own land and his
challege to an action that relaxes controls on his neighbor's. Yet it
is the presence of review based on the latter type of challenge that has
endowed our planning controls with the negative characteristics often
complained of.
Lest it be thought that I am suggesting sweeping and unlikely
reforms, let me say again that for the moment I am merely illustrating
those factors that may discourage better forms of residential development. For better or for worse, we do in fact expose local planning
action to challenge by disaffected neighbors. Wise or inevitable as
this may seem, it is still possible to complain of its effects and to cast
about for some modification that would retain what is worthwhile and
reject what is useless. For example, we might consider who carries
the risk of a spurious challenge. Under the present system, the challenger is free, but is under no obligation, to obtain a restraining order
or seek a stay in the local proceedings to stop development pending a
decision on the merits of his challenge. If he applies for a restraining
order or seeks a stay, he may be required to furnish a bond to cover
the developer's loss if the case goes against the challenger on the
merits."8 If he does not, and the developer proceeds with notice of
the pending action, there is little evidence that the challenger is prejudiced on the merits for failing to stop construction. 9 Normally, there18 Stays on appeal and restraining orders to prevent further construction in
zoning cases are commonly governed by the general rules of civil practice pertaining
to restraining orders, temporary injunctions, and ntpersedeas which either require
or give the court discretion to set bond. See, e.g., Weiner v. 222 East Chestnut St.

Corp., 303 F.2d 630, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Cheltenham Township Appeal, 413 Pa.
379, 381, 196 A.2d 363, 364 (1964) ; cases cited note 19 infra.

19 See, e.g., Lavitt v. Pierre, 203 A.2d 289, 292 n.1 (Conn. 1964) (citing Armstrong v. Leverone, 105 Conn. 464, 475, 136 Atl. 71, 75-76 (1927) (a restrictive
covenant case)); Torello v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 127 Conn. 307, 16 A.2d 591
(1940) ; In re Riccardi's Appeal, 393 Pa. 337, 142 A.2d 289 (1958). It is, of course,
hard to say in any particular case to what extent the courts are influenced against
the plaintiff on the merits by his failure to prevent construction. For example,
Lavitt v. Pierre, wupra, went against plaintiff on the merits. There are one or two
covenant cases where the courts have denied permanent injunctive relief on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to obtain a preliminary injunction to stop construction,
even though the action for permanent injunction was filed promptly: Bauby v. Krasow,
107 Conn. 109, 115-16, 139 Atl. 508, 510-11 (1927) (alternative holding) ; University
Gardens Property Owners Ass'n v. Schultz, 272 App. Div. 949, 71 N.Y.S.2d 814,
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fore, the challenger will make no attempt to seek a stay or a restraining
order, thus throwing upon the developer the risk of determining which
way the case will go on the merits. Even a slight possibility that the
challenger might win will stop the developer from proceeding with the
construction. If the developer stops, and the case takes a year or two
before it is finally determined that the challenger was wrong on the
merits, the developer has lost the intervening return on his investment
in the project, not to mention the loss caused by slowdown in turnover and the possible loss because of an intervening change in the
market. These repercussions of the possibility of challenge-a possibility which runs high in any departure from standard developmentare not calculated to encourage the initial expenditures associated with
planned unit development.
Do We Need a Private Attorney General?
What is the position of the neighboring challenger? In pursuing
this question, I do not want to create the impression that I am unsympathetic to his interests or that he is as intrepid a litigant as the
attention given to him here would suggest. Rather, by examining the
position of the neighboring challenger, I want to draw attention to
some characteristics of our zoning system which affect its ability to
accommodate innovations such as planned unit development.
The neighboring challenger is, in a practical sense, the legal
guardian of the dynamic aspects of the zoning process. If local authorities doubt whether they are free to adopt any new approach in favor
of development that doubt must ultimately be traced to the presence
of the neighboring challenger. Potential applicants-as I plan to
demonstrate later-are not likely to test the issue.
The basic right of a neighbor to challenge planning action undertaken on land other than his own has been largely assumed by the
courts. Certainly, there has been very little serious discussion of the
point. Support for his standing can be found in the language of the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act which allows for review of the
board of adjustment at the instance of "any person aggrieved" or "any
taxpayer." 20 Clearly, the reference to "any taxpayer" carries the neighreversing 71 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct 1947). Both of these cases, however, involved
construction of a single dwelling. The cost of preventing construction until final
determination on the merits, therefore, might have been slight and the sympathy of
the court for the dwelling owner strong. Moreover, in Bauby the court consoled
itself by holding the plaintiff entitled to damages.
20 Section 7 of the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926) gave to "any person . . . aggrieved" and "any taxpayer"
standing to appeal to a court of record from "any decision of the board of adjustment!'; and gave to "any person aggrieved" the right to appeal to the board of adjustment from "any decision of the administrative officer." The reference to "any person
aggrieved" as a party entitled to appeal to and from the board of adjustment (or
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bor's standing, at least so far as review of the board is concerned. But
this language has been retained in the enabling legislation of only
seventeen jurisdictions." Even if one could say that the more frequent
reference to "persons aggrieved" demands standing for the neighbor, 2
that reference is applied in the statutes only to review of local administrative action. Indeed, the statutes are commonly silent about review
of local legislative action, 23 yet the neighbor has been accorded standing.
board of appeals) is found in the zoning enabling legislation of thirty-five jurisdictions: ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 781 (Supp. 1963) ; ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 783 (1959) ; CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 8-7, 8-8 (Supp. 1963) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-821, 69-827 (1957)
(substitutes "any person . . . [having] a substantial interest" for "any person
aggrieved"); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-779, 53-783 (1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-2913 (1949) ("any person having an interest in the property affected"-quaere
whether this language extends to the neighbor); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.079,
100.085 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4727 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 40A, §§ 13, 21 (1961); MIcn. STAT. ANN. §§5.2935(a), 5.2940 (1958); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 89.100, 89.110 (1949) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:74, 31:77 (1955)
("any person directly affected thereby") ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-20-6, 14-20-7
(Supp. 1965); N.Y. TOWN LAW §§267(2), (7); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b; N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 11-33-10, 11-33-12 (1960) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 45-24-16, 45-24-20
(1956); UTAH CODE ANN. §§10-9-9, 10-9-15 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§36.70.810 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 525oo, 525rr (1961). In addition to these
states, there are seventeen jurisdictions which have retained the reference to both
"any taxpayer" and "any person aggrieved." See note 21 infra. See also text accompanying notes 22-29 infra.
21
Retaining the reference to "any taxpayer" are: ALASKA STAT. § 29.10.240
(1962); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-465 (E) (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 328
(1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.16 (Supp. 1964) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.15 (1949) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 7(j), 22(i) (Supp. 1964); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 11-2707(8) (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-912 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 408 (1959) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14759 (1957) (first class cities);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25057 (1957) (second class cities-for "any taxpayer"
substitutes "any property owner"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 58107 (Supp. 1964)
(first class township); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67007 (Supp. 1964) (second class
township); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4701014 (1962); S.D. CODE § 45.2608 (1939); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. art. 1011g (1963) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3022 (1959) ; VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1497 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. §62.23(7)(e)10 (1957); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 15-626(h) (1957).
22
As experience with similar language in federal statutes plainly demonstrates,
reference to "any persons aggrieved" in and of itself obviously does not require that
the neighbor be given standing. See Harrison-Halstead Community Group v. Housing
& Home Fin. Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963);
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
dended, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (both cases holding that Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1958), allowing review at the instance of "any person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved," did
not serve to take the plaintiffs outside the rationale of Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464 (1938) (the court held that a utility company had no standing to question
the validity of federal loans to a competitor, since the plaintiff's desire to be free of the
threat of lawful competition was not a legal interest). The Supreme Court has
twice read similar language in the Communications Act § 14, 66 Stat. 718 (1952),
47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1958), more broadly: Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476
(1940). Although these cases remain controversial, they certainly do not stand for
the proposition that a statutory reference to "persons aggrieved" automatically extends standing to any person whose interests are affected in any way, regardless of
other considerations. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961). See also part one of the two-part article under
title Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265
(1961).
23 The validity of legislative action, through rezoning, is commonly tested at
the instance of the neighbor by declaratory judgment or by injunction (the catchall
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What then is the real basis for granting standing to the neighbor?
Normally he is not asserting an independent common-law cause of
action such as nuisance or trespass 24 (and if he were, it might be said
that he has an adequate private remedy). Furthermore, if he should
claim that there has been a "taking," he would find little support in
the cases. Although the neighbor may suffer a loss, a similar loss
of judicial review). See, e.g., Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 205-06,
66 N.W.2d 113, 115-16 (1954) (declaratory judgment); Richmark Realty v. Whittlif,
226 Md. 273, 280-82, 173 A.2d 196, 200-01 (1961) (declaratory judgment) ; Cassel v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 353-54, 73 A.2d 486, 487-88
(1950) (injunction); Brechner v. Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 23 Misc.
2d 159, 160, 201 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (declaratory judgment-citing
earlier cases, many of which involved challenges by landowner directly affected. It
may be noted, furthermore, that Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115,
96 N.E.2d 731 (1951), a case of special significance to planned unit zoning procedures, see note 44 infra, came up for review by declaratory judgment, a fact that
is indicated by the lower court opinion, 276 App. Div. 1019, 96 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1950)).
Although most of the cases require that the neighbor show special damage, i.e.,
damage different from that suffered by the public at large, they do not explore the
significance of this limitation. See additional cases collected at note 26 infra; text
accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
Cases which deal with the propriety of review by prerogative writ reflect considerable uncertainty about the foundations for such a review. Sunderland v. Building
Inspector of North Andover, 328 Mass. 638, 105 N.E.2d 471 (1952) (mandamus
proper remedy) ; State ex rel. Croy v. City of Raytown, 289 S.W.2d 153 (Kan. City,
Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (certiorari not proper remedy) ; Gammino v. Town Council of
South Kensigton, 182 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1962) (certiorari not proper remedy) ; Pierce v.
King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963) (certiorari proper remedy).
For the New Jersey view, see text accompanying notes 31-35 infra. One Pennsylvania court, puzzled by the absence of statutory provision for review, held that the
neighbor can appeal from a rezoning under the provision allowing "any person
aggrieved" to appeal from the board of adjustment, see note 20 Vipra. The court
reasoned that the board "is only an authorized arm or agency of the city council,"
and that obviously a statute that provides for review of the agent necessarily provides for review of the principal: Huebner v. Philadelphia Sav. Fund Soc'y, 127
Pa. Super. 28, 32-33, 192 Atl. 139, 140-41 (1937).
The problem was finally solved
in Knup v. Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350, 126 A.2d 399 (1956), which held that the
neighbor must wait until issuance of the building permit, then appeal to the board
of adjustment and from the board to the courts (thus forcing the entire proceeding
under the statutory language of § 7 of the Standard Act, see note 20 mupra). Nor
is New York immune from some confusion as to whether the New York equivalent
of § 7 of the standard act will support review of certain decisions of the local legislative body. The confusion stems from the fact that New York has dropped the
reference to "any taxpayer," see note 20 supra. With the reference gone, the New
York equivalent of § 7 is susceptible to the construction that "any person aggrieved"
may obtain review not only of any decision of the board of appeals but of any
"decision" of the village or town board (which is the local legislative body). Since
review under the New York equivalent of § 7 is controlled by Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Law (statutory certiorari), this has raised some interesting questions not
entirely irrelevant to our problem because they lie close to the controversy in Rodgers,
supra. However, these questions are too complicated to justify examination here:
see Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 181 N.E.2d 407, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374
(1962) ; Zeifman v. Board of Trustees of Great Neck, 40 Misc. 2d 130, 242 N.Y.S.2d
738 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Parkplain Realty Corp. v. Town Board, 137 N.Y.S.2d 474
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
241 would not want to be taken as saying that absent a common-law cause of
action the neighbor cannot make a claim to standing. Rather, all that I have said
so far is that he cannot rest his claim on a common-law cause of action and, to this
extent, his case falls initially within the narrow "invasion of legal right" doctrine of
a case such as Alabama Power discussed at note 22 supra. Nor does a statutory
provision extending review to "any person aggrieved" automatically establish his
claim to standing. Plainly, however, he has other strings to his bow and these are
explored in the text and notes that follow.
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occasioned by a far more decisive participation of government in the
use of neighboring property-through condemnation-cannot be
claimed as a taking.25 Moreover, I do not believe he has an equal
protection argument. He is not asking for equal freedom for himself,
only equal restrictions for others. Although the neighbor's claim to
constitutional protection may not be disposed of that easily, there is,
in the last analysis, very little to support the view that his standing
is constitutionally compelled. This is not the place to expand at
length on these points. Suffice it to say that the neighbor's standing
to obtain review is neither obviously conferred by statute nor obviously compelled by any constitutional principle." In short, if we extend
standing to the neighbor, it is either because we are persuaded that
zoning is primarily designed to protect his interests, as distinguished
25 See, e.g., Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 354-56 (1903); Campbell v.
United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924) (extending the principle of Sharp and other
cases to hold that severance damages are limited to the loss attributable to government use of the severed land and does not include loss attributable to government use
of other adjacent land taken from other owners). The Court stated:
If the former private owners had devoted their lands to the identical uses
for which they were acquired by the United States or to which they probably
will be put, as found by the court, they would not have become liable for
the resulting diminution in value of plaintiff's property. The liability of the
United States is not greater than would be that of the private users ....

266 U.S. 368, 371-72.
The reader will, of course, note that there have been many cases since then
involving government interferences with the use of adjacent land where a constitutionally compensable "taking" (or "damage"-where the state constitution so provides)
has been found although no part of the tract had been actually confiscated. See
MANDELKER, INvERSE CONDEMNATION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LimiTs oF PUBLIc RESPONSIBILITY (1964).
But all those cases, I would submit, present the question of

whether the government can sustain an even smaller scope of liability than the private
owner-none go so far as to give constitutional protection to loss that would not
ground a private action against a private individual.
26An individual probably has no constitutional right to demand that the government maintain restrictions on others to protect his own restricted use, Ayer v. Commissioners on Heights of Bldgs., 242 Mass. 30, 36, 136 N.E. 338, 340-41 (1922), even
if he has bought in a restricted area on the faith that the restrictions would be maintained. No one, the courts have stated, can claim a "vested right" in the restrictions
established in his district. Bischoff v. Hennessy, 251 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. Ct. App.
1952); Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 143-44, 96 A.2d 27, 29-30 (1953); Page
v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 639, 165 P.2d 280, 283 (1946) ; Gratton v. Conte,
364 Pa. 578, 584-85, 73 A.2d 381, 385 (1950); Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis.
213, 218-19, 1 N.W.2d 84, 86-87 (1941) ; Ham v. Weaver, 227 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1950). This, however, does not dispose of the matter. Though reliance does not give the neighbor a vested right to the established restrictions, it may
be argued that it does give him the right to protest relaxations which are not for
the public good. Indeed, a number of cases have put the neighbor's rights in those
terms: Friedland v. City of Hollywood, 130 So. 2d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ;
Garner v. City of Carni, 28 Ill.
2d 560, 564, 192 N.E.2d 817, 818-19 (1963) ; Kennedy
v. City of Evanston, 348 Ill.
426, 429, 181 N.E. 312, 313 (1932) ; see Wakefield and
Page supra, at pages cited. But, put in those terms, is this a recognition of a constitutional right in the neighbor, or is it rather the recognition of a need for having
someone who can guard the interests of the community at large? It certainly does
not matter which interpretation is adopted, as long as we are persuaded that the
neighboring challenger performs a useful function in the latter role. See text at
notes 31-34 infra.
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from those of the public at large,27 or because we sense that the interests
of the public at large cannot be left at the mercy of elected officials,
or both.
Traditionally, of course, our zoning has been conceived of much
more as an extension of individual property rights than as an instrument of public policy." Reflecting this view, the courts have sometimes stated that the neighbor must show individual loss, as distinguished from loss suffered by the public at large, before he will be
accorded standing. 9 But the courts that have adopted this requirement
have seldom made any serious effort to define what sort of loss is
entitled to protection; indeed, in most cases, the bare allegation of loss
2 7
Support for the neighboring challenger on this basis is not lacking. The whole
history of our zoning laws emphasizes their character as an extension of private
property rights. It was mainly on this basis that the Supreme Court came to terms
with zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning,

so far as the Court was concerned, was merely an extension of the government's

police power). The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr § 5 (U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, rev. ed. 1926), reflects this understanding by requiring a larger majority
of the governing body to enact a zoning change protested by a certain percentage
of the neighbors. Twenty-six jurisdictions have adopted this protest requirement:
ALAsxA STAT. § 29.10.225 (1962); Axiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-462 (1956); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 8-3 (1958); DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 305 (1953); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 176.06 (1941); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-405 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
§ 11-13-14 (1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 414.5 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2907
(1964) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 5 (1957) ; MICH. Coip. LAWS § 125.584 (1948) ;
MISS. CODE ANN. § 3594 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.060 (1949); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 11.2705 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-905 (1962); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 31:64 (1955) ; N.Y. TOWN LAW § 265; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 40-47-05 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14756 (1957) (first class cities) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §25056 (1957) (second class cities) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53,
§ 58105 (1957) (first class township) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67005 (Supp. 1964)
(second class township) ; RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-24-5 (1956) ; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 47-1005 (1962) ; S.D. CODE §§ 45.2604, 45.2605 (Supp. 1960) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 101le (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3012 (1958); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 62.23 (7) (d) (Supp. 1965) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 15-624 (1957).
It could be argued, of course, that the protest requirement cuts the other way,
and that it was intended to be the neighbors' sole assurance of responsible public
action. But this view, though not excluded by the comment of the draftsmen, see
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT § 5, comment (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
rev. ed. 1926), would hardly reflect the spirit of that time. Likewise, it seems clear
that the draftsmen of the standard act, and the legislatures that adopted this language,
intended to include the neighbor within the ambit of "persons aggrieved." Bassett,
it may be noted, saw the standard act's provisions for review largely as a safety
valve against complete invalidation of zoning-a view which does not address itself
to the complaints of a neighbor. See Bassett, Zoning, 9 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 311,
331 (1920). There is evidence that he opposed the provision which would allow
standing to "any taxpayer." See WLAMS, LAW OF CrY PLANNING AND ZONING
204 n.14 (1922).
But this does not prove anything about his intent towards the
neighbor. Indeed, he later assumes, as did everyone else then or since, that the
neighbor is included within the language "persons aggrieved." BASSETr, ZONING,
153 (1926). In short, the neighbor has history on his side when he argues that the
zoningthat
legislation
intended
to give him
standing.
response to
sterile
point
he can show
no independent
legal
right, heAnd
can in
counter with thethe
point, no
less sterile, that the statute conferred new rights upon him. See Circle Lounge &
Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 430-31, 86 N.E.2d 920,
922-23 (1949).
28 See note 27 ,epra.
29 See cases cited notes 23, 26 stepra.
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has been accepted as decisive. I shall come back to this point again. 0
It is enough to say here that standing to obtain review might have been
drawn more narrowly were it not for the prevailing lack of confidence
in our planning process. The neighboring challenger is seen as a useful
guardian of its integrity.
This view has been most strongly expressed in New Jersey. The
New Jersey Supreme Court summarized the result of the cases: "we
have recognized a broad right in taxpayers and citizens of a municipality to seek review of local legislative action without proof of unique
financial detriment to them . . . . The community at large has an
interest in the integrity of the zoning plan . ... ,"" The broad

right to standing in New Jersey goes back at least to the oft cited
opinion of Judge Dixon in State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams. 2 Noting
that in England the private action to redress a public wrong has been
infrequently allowed, Judge Dixon stated:
with us the exception to the rule is extended so far as to justify this court in acting by mandamus, certiorari or quo
warranto, at the instance of private persons, for the redress or
prevention of public wrongs by public bodies and officers
•. whenever the applicant is one of the class of persons
to be most directly affected in their enjoyment of public rights,
and the public convenience will be subserved by the remedy
desired.3 3
The neighboring challengers appear "so to speak, [as] private
Attorney Generals" " to assert the public interest.
If the neighboring challenger's standing rests largely on the idea
that we need a private Attorney General, do we need an irresponsible
one? This thought was uppermost in Judge Dixon's mind when he
confirmed the wide role of the New Jersey challenger. He said:
The general indifference of private individuals to public omissions and encroachments, the fear of expense in unsuccessful
and even in successful litigation, and the discretion of the
court, have been, and doubtless will continue to be, a suffiofficials against too numerous and
cient guard to these public
3
unreasonable attacks.
S0
31

1

See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra.
Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.j. 154, 177-78, 131 A.2d 1, 13-14

(1957).
3241 N.J.L. 332 (Sup. Ct 1879).
83 Id. at 339.
:34The analogy was proposed by Judge Frank in a different context: Associated
Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) ; see note 22 spra.
35 State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 339 (Sup. Ct 1879).
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Is that our experience in suburban zoning? If not, should we
consider some additional guards against unreasonable attacks? Despite
the impatient tone of my remarks, I am not insisting that the neighboring challenger be eliminated, although that has been virtually the case
6
under the English Town and Country Planning Act for years3 If
our system of zoning administration were of better quality, I might
urge that the challenger be eliminated. It seems clear that his presence has given our planning controls an even greater local bias than
is necessary. Moreover, because planning decisions are made on a
local level, there is much to be said for the view that local redress for
decisions that favor development (and that is what we are talking
about) lies in the ballot box and not in the courts. However, I said
earlier that I would not urge sweeping or unlikely reforms.
Consideration might be given to requiring the neighboring challenger to post adequate security for costs and, to some appropriate
extent, for the loss that he might cause to the private defendant in
the case." This security might be made a discretionary matter with
the courts or other reviewing agencies so that egregious abuse or
injury would not go unchecked. It was noted at the outset of this
discussion that the possibility of a neighboring challenge can have a
marked effect on a developer's choice between standard development
and something more imaginative. Not only does the imaginative development require greater expenditures at the start but also, as matters
now stand, it is more likely to be challenged. This greater likelihood,
incidentally, is a curious reflection on neighboring challengers in general. It is not that the neighboring challenger would prefer the standard development; it is that he would prefer no development at all, and
a departure from the normal encourages him to try his hand.
In suggesting that the neighboring challenger be required to post
appropriate security, I recognize that there are many problems. For
example, on what basis would the court or other reviewing body determine that security ought to be posted? 1s What would be "appropriate
security"? Security for costs of litigation incurred by the public
and private defendants in the case may serve the purpose of discouraging
some baseless suits, but I question whether it would encourage the de3 See note 39 infra.
37The suggestion that the neighboring challenger be required to post security is
not radical; a shareholders' derivative action has the same requirement in a number
of states. Indeed, the position of the shareholder in a derivative suit bears a strong
resemblance to the position of the neighboring challenger in a zoning case. Neither,
it might be said, has an individual claim, but both stand to lose if their interests as
a whole are not vindicated. In both cases, however, there is a danger that baseless
suits will have adverse effects on the interests of the entity as a whole. See text
accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
38 See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
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veloper to invest in a departure from standard development unless the
security covers that investment. On the other hand, to require such
security would mean that the larger the project the less likely that it
could be attacked. That may not be such an objectionable thought
when we consider that the larger projects cannot occur in the heart
of a community where they are likely to be regarded as disruptions
of the established pattern. Indeed, the experience with larger projects
has been that they have not been attacked. But that is no argument
for making them immune, unless one has little faith in the private
attorney general and is ready to abandon him. Perhaps, the security
should be measured by the developer's investment but given a ceiling
so that the larger project would not escape review.
There are other possible variations on the idea of security. For
example, under the English system, the neighboring challenger has
standing to obtain review only when permission for development has
been granted for a use which falls within a certain class designated by
the Minister of Housing and Local Government. 39 The very limited
9
- In Buxton v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, [1961] 1 Q.B. 278
(1960), the Minister granted an application for a chalk pit and neighbors sought
review under what is now § 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1962, 10 &
11 Eliz. 2, c. 38. The court held that a neighbor is not "a person aggrieved" within
that section unless he is a "section 37 party." Section 37 parties are those who
under § 37 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 53 (repealed)
(now §§ 15, 16 and 17 of the act of 1962) are entitled to "make representations" in
regard to an application for development. These individuals are: (a) the owner of
the land in question (if the applicant is not the owner) ; (b) the tenant of an agricultural holding (if the applicant is not the tenant) ; and (c) any member of the public
if the proposed development falls within a class designated by the Minister under
what is now § 15 of the act of 1962. Obviously only (c) brings in the neighbor.
The Minister has designated the following as developments falling under § 15 of the
act. STAT. INSTR., 1963, No. 709:
(a) construction of buildings for use as a public convenience;
(b) construction of buildings or other operations, or use of land, for the
disposal of refuse or waste materials;
(c) construction of buildings or other operations (other than laying of
sewers, the construction of septic tanks serving single dwelling houses,
and works ancillary thereto) or use of land, for purpose of sewage disposal;
(d) construction of buildings or use of land for purposes of a slaughterhouse or knacker's yard;
(e) construction of buildings and use of buildings for any of the following
purposes, namely, as a theatre, cinema, a music hall, a dance hall, a
skating rink, a swimming bath or gymnasium (not forming part of a
school, college or university), a Turkish or other vapour or foam bath,
a building for indoor games.
Since, in the Buxton case, the application was for a chalk pit, which was not within
a class designated by the Minister, the neighbors were not "section 37 parties" with
regard to it. It might be noted here that Buxton was a case where the local authority
had denied the development application, but the Minister granted it on appeal by the
applicant. Had the application involved a development within the designated class,
(for example, a cinema) it is implicit in Buxton that the neighbor would have standing to appeal from the Minister to the courts. But what if such an application is
granted by the local authority? Under the Town and Country Planning Act, appeals
from the local authority can only be taken to the Minister, and the act provides for
appeals only by the disappointed applicant, §23 of Town and Country Planning
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number of uses effected are known popularly as the "unneighborly
uses" and include such items as "a public convenience," "a slaughterhouse or knacker's yard," and, interestingly enough, "a building for
indoor games." 40 While this way of limiting the neighboring challenge may not be acceptable or feasible in this country, the idea of a
list of "unneighborly uses" might be adapted for the limited purpose
of determining whether the neighboring challenger should be required
to post security.
The Role of the Courts-Progressby Crude Categories
The fact that existing zoning controls tend to focus on the lot
rather than on the project is often explained historically. The draftsmen of the enabling legislation, it is said, lived in a world where the
subdivider's interest ran only to the sale of the raw land in lots and
where residential development was left to the individual decision of
the lot owner who would contract with a builder of his choosing.
Similarly, the rigid segregation of uses is attributable to a world where
there seemed to be no need for distinguishing between a use and its
physical manifestations to determine its compatibility with other uses.
Thus an industrial use in any of its then physical manifestations was
obviously incompatible with a residential use, a multi-family use was
incompatible with a single family use and so forth. Things have
changed since then, and now both planners and consumers are willing
to draw finer distinctions, looking to the performance of various uses
in their various physical manifestations. The courts, however, have
somehow failed to recognize this change and have steadfastly remained
tied to the old ideas. The picture one gets of the courts is that they
simply stumbled along a false path for no better reason than that this
was the way they were pointed at the start.
This description, of course, does not do justice to the current
analysis of the situation; but, in all, there has been too much emphasis
Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 38. If the result is that the neighbor can obtain review
of the action of the Minister reversing a local denial, but has no right to review
a local grant, even in respect to the designated class of "unneighborly uses," this
provides an interesting insight into the philosophy of the English system. The court
in Buxton furnishes us with another insight. In holding that the neighbor was not
"a person aggrieved" under § 179 (unless he is a § 37 party), the court had this
to say:
Before the Town and Country Planning legislation any landowner was free
to develop his land as he liked, provided he did not infringe the common law.
No adjoining owner had any right which he could enforce in the courts in
respect of such development unless he could show that it constituted a nuisance
or trespass or the like. The scheme of the Town and Country Planning legislation, in my judgment, is to restrict development for the benefit of the public
at large and not to confer new rights on any individual members of the
public . . ..

[1961] 1 Q.B. at 283.

40 See STAT. INSTR., 1963, No. 709.
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on the historical explanation. Conditions existing at the time when
our planning controls were conceived cannot explain why the old
lot by lot focus and the old idea of rigid separation of uses have become
so firmly entrenched in our system. Nor does the emphasis on historical factors furnish us with any guide for deciding what changes
should be made and what problems lie ahead of such changes.
I believe that the tendency to focus on the lot and to separate
various uses including various housing types is an inevitable tendency
for any system that: (1) allows for the review of planning decisions at
the instance of neighboring owners without seriously considering the
purposes that can be served, the scope of the review or the criteria
that ought to be applied; and (2) is biased in favor of control by regulations established in advance, regulations so detailed that specific
proposals will be disposed of more or less automatically when presented-in short, a system which prefers to fashion the shoe without
Cinderella.
To say that the bias in favor of preset regulations poses problems
for planned unit residential development is to say nothing new. The
question really is, what is the strength of that bias and why does it
exist? Fundamentally, it is an expression of the idea that government
must act in a general and impartial manner and that to encourage
responses to individual applications for development would be to encourage discrimination, favoritism, and perhaps even worse. Attractive as this idea is, its application to zoning raises a number of
questions: Who will normally claim its protection? Who or what
will decide whether there has been a violation? How can its values
be most practically secured without compromising other equally important values ?
In speaking to these questions, it should be noted that whatever
technique is used for handling planned unit developments will not supplant standard lot by lot controls. Lot by lot development can still
occur. If new techniques become available for handling whole residential projects, it is generally assumed that the project developer will be
given the choice between the standard lot by lot approach and the
planned unit approach. Of course the choice to proceed by standard
development could be closed off. I do not plan to elaborate this
possibility here. It would give a whole new dimension to a problem
that has not been solved in its simpler form-where the developer is
given a choice. Moreover, at least in the suburbs, there are practical
reasons why planned unit development will tend to remain only a
choice along with standard development. The idea that development
might be encouraged by allowing reductions in lot size against off-
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setting open space is hard enough to sell, even when no departure from
single family detached housing is contemplated. The idea that varied
housing types might be introduced would encounter even more opposition. That these departures might be required is, at present, unthinkable.
If approval of a planned unit development is a departure from
standard controls, who is most likely to raise the question whether
approval is rationally and evenly dispensed, which we have recognized
as the reason for demanding that all of the controls be preset? The
developer who received the approval? Obviously not. The developer
who received the approval but got less than he asked for? Is he likely
to litigate, when the simple answer to his complaint is that he can
always go standard development? The developer who was turned
down? Is not the same answer available as to him? The developer
who was turned down or who got less than he asked for on the grounds
that another developer got what he asked for? This is more likely,
but would he think it worth his while to face all of the distinctions
that could be made on the facts?
I believe that the developer is an extremely unlikely litigant. That
does not mean that he has no interest in having the planned unit controls preset; but his interest is much less an interest in protecting
impartiality and equality than it is in predicting how his proposal will
be treated. That his is a different interest becomes clear when we
consider that even if all of the controls are preset, there would be little
to prevent the local public authority from tightening them when confronted with the developer's proposal. The local public authority has
been allowed to do this in standard zoning 4 and, in the case cf
planned unit controls there would always be the answer that the developer is free to go standard development.
Since developers are always threatened with a last minute change
of mind, their interest in preset controls is largely a guide to what
they are required to do, assuming the requirements are not changed.
They have a far greater concern for the integrity of the rules once
41 See, e.g., People ex rel. Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 206 N.E.2d 441 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1965); Morris v. Postuna, 41 N.J. 354, 196 A.2d 792 (1964); Key
Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Gramatan Hills Manor
Inc. v. Manganiello, 30 Misc. 2d 117, 313 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct 1961); York
Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Brown, 74 York 197 (1960), aff'd, 407 Pa.
649, 182 A.2d 706 (1962); cases collected, Annot., 169 A.L.R. 584 (1947). The
fact that the reported cases most frequently involve uses such as apartments, gas
stations, motels and shopping centers, should not be taken as proof that single family
residential uses are less frequently exposed to tightened regulations, but merely that
single family residential developers are less likely to litigate beyond the lower court.
That proposals for single family residential development are exposed to frequent
change in regulations is indicated by the developer's need for legislation discussed in
notes 124-29 infra and accompanying text.
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their proposal has been approved-a concern which I have argued is
legitimate and should be satisfied if planned unit development is to be
encouraged. Another way of phrasing all this is that the developer's
interest is to predict what the requirements will be and to prevent
their tightening after he has received approval. On changes after
approval, the developer can expect very little sympathy from the courts
because the courts have never worried about the exercise of discretion
which tightens apparent requirements. But the exercise of discretion
which relaxes apparent requirements has been a different matter-here
the courts tend to go to pieces. And the moving litigant is, of course,
the neighboring challenger.
This brings us back to the point of our beginning, the neighboring
challenger. His presence, I have argued, must be defended largely on
the grounds that he serves as a guardian of rational and impartial
decision making in our planning process. But he performs this function only for those decisions which are favorable to development. This
point cannot be overemphasized. It is at the neighbor's insistence
that the courts are forced to fashion a philosophy of change-of progress, if you will. What has been that philosophy?
Basically, it has been a philosophy of fear, fear of an inability to
distinguish good change from bad, a fear all the more fickle because of
a failure to define what is meant by "good" and "bad." Let me expand
on this point, for it has an important bearing on the reception which
may await various approaches to planned unit development control.
Consider first how the courts have treated planning action which
tightens (or fails to relax) regulations. Here, although the courts
have professed to reach the merits of the action taken, they have in
fact studiously avoided coming to an independent judgment of the
value (in the planning sense) of what was done. They have taken
refuge in a crude balancing process, balancing the burden placed on
the challenger's land against the interests of the community.4 By
employing this balancing process, the courts have been able to delude
themselves that they are deciding the merits of the planning action,
whereas what they are deciding is largely whether a presumption of
its merits is outweighed by whatever sympathy can be mustered on
42 The "refuge" part of the process is to be found in the assumption that local
planning action must be tested solely by the interests of the community in which it

occurs, see Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441
(1954) (the most notable exception to date), and in the presumption that the decision
of the local officials is the best evidence on the question of whether the interests of
the community are in fact well served. See Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958). Fortunately, in the
type of case that we are considering, this presumption does not automatically dispose
of the whole issue, since the loss to the challenger's property must be balanced
against it.
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behalf of the challenger. Some element of judgment on the merits
is, of course, present in assigning a value to the sympathy for the
challenger. But when that judgment becomes difficult, the courts
always have the challenger's loss to supply a sense of meaning to the
process in which they are engaged.
Wholly different in this respect is the case where planning action
relaxes applicable regulations and is drawn into question by the neighboring challenger. Here, not only is it difficult to say that the neighboring challenger is asserting a constitutionally protected right of his
own,43 but his loss is frequently slight and almost never large enough
to weigh sufficiently in the balance-if the merits of the planning action
are presumed.
One can therefore understand the discomfiture of the courts when
faced with this kind of a case. The courts, I think, sense that the neighboring challenger has little standing of his own. They sense, I think,
that he is there to protect the public interest, and that they are being
called upon to reach the merits of the planning action. They sense,
in effect, that they are being forced into the shoes of the plannera role which they have eschewed, and which they are ill-equipped to
fulfill. It was in this kind of a case that the Pennsylvania court took
the unprecedented step in Eves4 4 of calling for a comprehensive plan.
In other words, the court was calling upon the planner for help. A
43 See notes 25-26 supra.
44
Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower Gwynedd Township, 401 Pa. 211,
164 A.2d 7 (1960). The facts of the case were the following: On April 28, 1958, the
township adopted an ordinance creating an "F-1, Limited Industrial District." The
district was not then located on the zoning map. Instead, its location was to be
determined at the time of application for development by a procedure conforming in
all respects to the requirements of the enabling act prescribed for zoning amendments. The ordinance establishing this "floating" district contained a great number
of detailed limitations designed to assure the community that the industrial uses permitted by the ordinance would not have an adverse impact on surrounding uses
(particularly residential and allied uses). Whether an application would be acted on
favorably was implicitly left to the discretion of the township supervisors, because
approval required a further ordinance rezoning the applicant's land to the limited
industrial district authorized under the original ordinance. On January 5, 1959, pursuant to an application filed on September 11, 1958 and after a public hearing, the
township supervisors did rezone a 103 acre tract (lying in the "A" residential district)
to the limited industrial district. Neighbors challenged the rezoning in the courts.
(It is interesting to note that they followed the unique Pennsylvania procedure,
described in note 23 .mpra. They waited for the issuance of a building permit, then
appealed from this to the board of adjustment and finally to the courts.) Both the
board and the common pleas court held in favor of the township. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding both the rezoning ordinance and the original ordinance invalid on
the grounds that such "case by case" rezoning was not contemplated by the enabling
act, 401 Pa. at 211, 164 A.2d at 12, and that the actions taken were violative of the
requirement that zoning be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." In discussing
the latter requirement, the court, for the first time in zoning history, appeared to
call for a plan embodied in documents other than the text and map of the zoning
ordinance itself, 401 Pa. at 216, 218-19, 164 A.2d at 10, 11. For a while, it seemed
that the court might require such a plan as a condition precedent to all zoning action,
but that expectation has since been proved wrong. The case and its repercussions
are further considered at notes 46-68 infra and accompanying text.
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whole history of the role of the courts in planning could be written
from this point of view. I do not have the space to do this sensitively
here. The most that I can do is to sketch some tentative thoughts for
the value that they may have in determining an approach to planned
unit development.
In reviewing planning changes that amount to relaxation of established regulations, what would be one's predominant concern and what
rules would one tend to establish in order to avoid being drawn into
the planning function? All changes that amount to relaxation of established regulations are, of course, occasions for discrimination. I am
sure that the courts have realized that this is a predominant concern.
But they have failed to focus on it sufficiently to see a way out of a
dilemma: How to assure a rational and impartial process of change yet
avoid being drawn into the planning function? As a result, the courts
were in fact drawn half-way into the planning function and in the
process developed a plan of their own-a plan which was never any
good and which today, the courts recognize, makes no sense at all.
It has frequently been noted that the cornerstone of the courts'
own plan was a prohibition against change which would introduce
"islands" that differ from the surrounding use. In this, the courts
have been roundly criticized for failing to differentiate uses on the
basis of "performance" and for failing to respond to modem needs.
For example, in the Eves case,45 the court failed to recognize that to
prelocate the industrial districts would have inflated the price of the
land and discouraged the early location of industry in the community,
which is what the community needed.
This traditional analysis of the spot zoning concept is sound, but
it misses an essential point. By prohibiting spot zoning, the courts
were in fact forcing all relatively minor changes to take place by way
of an extension of existing use districts. I think this rule arose out
of a desire to prevent discrimination and favoritism. How does it
furnish such protection? The chances of an extension being an act
of favoritism are, of course, somewhat less than in the case of an
"island" because an extension can only go in so many directions.
Moreover, even the layman can sometimes hazard a guess as to the
most likely direction.46
See note 44 mipra.
This, incidentally, explains the courts' penchant for ribbon commercial development How else can one explain Pumo v. Borough of Norristown, 404 Pa. 475, 172
A.2d 828 (1961)? The case followed Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Lower
Gwynedd Township, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960), by less than a year, yet the
45
46

court held that an extension of a commercial district along a highway was obviously
"in accord with a comprehensive plan" though the borough had no plan other than
what could be divined by contemplation of the zoning ordinance and map alone. See
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However, it would not be meaningful to insist on change by
extension of existing use districts unless one were also to insist that
the community be divided into use districts as an initial matter."'
Furthermore, holding all changes to extension of existing use districts can most usefully perform its function of assurance against favoritism and discrimination if uses are divided into a few crude categories,
each in its own district, and if all extensions are held to the same crude
category as the district that is extended. For example, if a commercial
district includes uses ranging from shopping to gas stations, local
public authorities are liable to think twice before extending that district
into a residential area for a favorite, even if the favorite intends to
build a small colonial looking store on a large, beautifully landscaped
lot.48 Moreover, and this is critical, the courts will find it more
comfortable reviewing that decision since the uses permitted in the
district are in crude contrast with residential use, and the court does
not have to pay attention to the particular plan of development
proposed.
What I am trying to say here is that the courts feel threatened
when asked to review any zoning change which seeks to blend apparently different uses sensitively to each other. For example, the
courts have never been troubled by a legislative or administrative case
by case location of gas stations.' 9 They have never been afraid of
reaching the merits of spot zoning when the change had elements of
crude contrast with the surrounding uses. But in Eves, the court failed
to reach the merits of the actual location of the floating industrial district. Rather it held the idea of case by case redistricting invalid as
not enabled."0
It has been said that Eves was a classic case of the spot zoning
objection, and that the court simply chose to overlook the fact that the
also City of Little Rock v. Andres, 237 Ark. 658, 375 S.W.2d 370 (1964). Puino
was the first of a series of cases that mark a retreat by the Pennsylvania court from
the position taken in Eves, so far as comprehensive planning is concerned. See note
68 infra.
4

'E.g., Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957);
Town
4 of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis. 2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958).
sWhat other explanation is there for Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d
456 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) ? Why did the town of Islip decide to secure the necessary
restrictions by covenant rather than in the rezoning ordinance itself in Church v.
Town of Islip, 6 Misc. 2d 810, 160 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd iner., 8 App.
Div. 2d 962, 190 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960)? The significance of Pierson, and of the related "contract
zoning" cases is discussed in LEG.Ar Ass'Ecrs OF PL.ANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVEL

eMNT §§ 3.23-.24.
49 The leading case is Green Point Say. Bank v. Zoning Appeals Bd., 281 N.Y.

534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939), appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1940). Green Point
served as support for Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d
731 (1951), which, in contrast to Eves approved an ordinance that contemplated a
case by case location of a garden apartment district. See note 69 infra; discussion
in LEAL AspEcts OF PLANNED UNIT RESMENTIAL DEVELOPMENT §§ 3.22-.23.
50 See note 44 suPtra.
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"ordinance contained limitations on every foreseeably objectionable
manifestation of the presence of industry." "' Despite the confused
character of the opinion, I do not think that the court overlooked this
fact. On the contrary, it realized that the presence of such detailed
limitations as well as the economic arguments against prelocating industrial districts, demanded the abandonment of the classic spot zoning
objection. But it realized too, that the very limitations that would
make the spot zoning objection rationally untenable also made its task
in reviewing the ultimate location of the district impossible. Where
the limitations would have the most success in controlling the impact
of the industrial use on its surroundings, the court would have the
greatest difficulty in ferreting out the case of favoritism and discrimination. That is why I say the court never reached the merits of the
location. Rather, it called for comprehensive planning in a new sense;
it was, as I have said, calling on the planner for help.
So far I have spoken of "change" as if there were no distinction to
be made between change that is undertaken legislatively and change
that is undertaken administratively. I intend to discuss the significance
of that distinction later. My purpose here is to emphasize the challenge
posed to the courts on review of any planning action that relaxes preestablished regulations in response to particular applications for development. Fundamentally, that challenge is the same whether the
action is undertaken legislatively or administratively. The prevailing
distinction between legislative and administrative action, however, may
affect the reactions to that challenge; alternatively, the reactions to
that challenge may affect the distinction. I do not overlook these
possibilities. But to understand the significance of the distinction, it is
important to understand the character of the challenge itself.
In Eves, the floating industrial district was finally located through
At one point in its opinion, the
a full-scale rezoning procedure.
court seems to suggest that the ordinance would have fared better if
the discretion to approve the location had been given to the board of
adjustment as a special exception function."3 Read superficially, one
might say that the court adopted the absurd position of requiring that
the legislature not only establish standards for the control of its future
legislative action, but that it do so with greater specificity than is required for the control of administrative action. But if the court struck
at the floating district because it felt itself threatened in its ability to
review, its dictum about the board of adjustment is understandable.
The court was simply pointing to the extremely narrow scope of review
51 Haar & Herring, The Lower Gwynedd Township Case: Too Flexible Zoning

(1961).
or an
5 2 Inflexible Judiciaryf, 74 HAgv. L. Ray. 1552, 1561
See note 44 supra.

53 401 Pa. at 219-220, 164 A.2d at 12.
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which is available on appeal from a legislative action in order to emphasize its predicament. 4 Although Eves involved a change which
attempted to relate industrial uses sensitively to surrounding residential
use, I have dwelt on it because I believe that the courts may sense the
same threat to their ability to review when the change involves an
attempt to relate different housing types sensitively to each other and
to the surrounding uses.
The traditional refuge of the courts, the requirement that all the
standards be set forth in advance of application for development, does
not offer a practical solution to the problem. The complexity of preestablished regulations that would automatically dispose of any proposal for planned unit development, when different housing types and
perhaps accessory commercial areas are envisaged, would be quite
considerable. Indeed as soon as various housing types are permitted,
the regulations that would govern their design and distribution on
every possible kind of site, their relationship to each other and their
relationship to surrounding properties must be complex unless the
developer's choice in terms of site, site plan, and design and distribution
of housing is reduced close to zero. It is not likely, I have noted, that
local authorities would want to adopt such a set of regulations. For
one thing, even an expert planner might have some reservations about
how such a complex set of regulations would work out in any particular case. Local authorities would sense these reservations even
more keenly.
The suggestion that one might have to accept anything that fits
the regulations without getting a second guess at it will, I think, be
viewed with such alarm by most local authorities and residents that
the idea of planned unit development would be rejected out of hand.
Perhaps this is more of a suburban than a center city problem. Indeed,
city officials may be willing to establish a set of regulations that fail
to exclude the less desirable project without retaining any discretion
to exclude it when presented. But if they are, it is because, in high
density areas, the cost of land and other factors exert their own pressure for conformity with the surroundings. In the suburbs the chances
of simplifying the regulations by setting them short of excluding the
poorer project are de minimis. Moreover, a suburban community that
brings itself to adopt a vastly complex set of regulations for planned
unit development is doing the developer no favor."5
In short, I believe that if planned unit development is to be encouraged, we must learn to live with the idea that such projects cannot
54 This

view is supported by the last paragraph in the opinion, 401 Pa. at 220,

164 A.2d at 12.
55 See discussion at pp. 65-66 supra.
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be fully preregulated and that, within bounds, there will have to be a
considerable leeway for discretion to be exercised by some appropriate
local authority at the time the project is presented. I believe that the
builder is prepared to live with this-he may even prefer it-provided
some other matters are resolved in his favor. For example, he would
want assurance that a project, once approved, would not be defeated
by a sudden change of mind on the part of local authorities. He would
prefer to get such assurance as early in the game as possible-before he
is forced to invest large sums in the preparation of detailed plans. He
would prefer a simple and direct procedure for approval through a
single agency and subject to only one public hearing. I have mentioned these points before, and I shall consider them in greater detail
shortly. 6
The builder will not object to a considerable amount of discretion
until approval, but the question is will the courts? It is time that the
courts reconsidered their role in review at the instance of the neigboring challenger. It is because the courts have failed to articulate for
themselves what interests are in need of judicial protection, and what
role they can profitably perform in this connection 57 that all attempts
to encourage better development have been surrounded by an uncertainty which has contributed to the sense that planning controls are
designed for the restraint of all development. Let me summarize and
develop further some of the points that should be considered:
(1) Are there some individual interests of the neighboring challenger that ought to be protected? Consider the neighboring challenger
who is complaining about a relaxation of regulations that have made
possible a planned unit residential development adjacent to his single
family home. I don't think he has any interest that would qualify for
protection unless the market value of his home will be impaired." I
recognize that this is the same as saying that if he does not like it he
should move and that this conflicts, perhaps, with the view established
elsewhere in property law that all locations are unique. But let me
take the easier case-where he will suffer a market loss. If his loss
is attributable to some avoidable feature of the design or distribution of
structures in the adjacent development-for example, when his home
is in the shadow of a blank wall of a garden apartment or town house-56 See text accompanying notes 74-108 infra.
M See notes 23, 26, 31-34 supra.
58 It has been noted, see note 23 supra, that the courts, while frequently calling
for a showing of "special damage," have seldom articulated what sort of loss is
entitled to protection. See the disagreement between majority and concurring opinions
in 222 East Chestnut St Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 14 Ill. 2d 190, 152 N.E.2d 465
(1958) (opinion on rehearing).
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that is one thing. But in the typical case, if the neighbor suffers loss,
it will be for different reasons: (1) because his home is worth less if
there is any residential development next door; and (2) because in this
development there are homes on smaller lots or garden apartments
bringing with them perhaps a different kind of people. I recognize
that it is hard to distinguish the complaint about the sheer physical
impact of the adjacent development, such as the blank wall, from these
other claims. For example, development will almost always increase
traffic congestion on the challenger's street. But when the neighboring
challenger is complaining about market loss we ought to recognize that
the loss which is attributable to legitimate competition among human
beings for a place under the sun is damnum absque injuria. Remember
that under our system of zoning, the competition in housing matters
is weighted heavily in favor of the existing resident and against the
newcomer. What we are dealing with is an existing resident who is
seeking the help of the courts against the intrusion of additional housing approved by his elected officials. The courts have given short
shrift to commercial owners who challenge the intrusion of other
commercial establishments because of competition. 9 I think that the
courts should make an attempt to identify the same element when it is
presented by the residential challenger and give it no recognition as a
legitimate individual interest. If such a practice were adopted as a
test of standing to challenge, it would probably eliminate most challenges to planned unit residential development.
But I doubt that the courts would adopt such a test because it
has undertones of social judgment and for that reason, if for no other,
would be fuzzy in application.6 ° But there is no reason why the courts
should not at least consider how weak, frequently, is the case of the
neighboring challenger in his claim for individual protection, even if
he sustains a loss.
(2) If the courts would but reflect on the weakness of the neighboring challenger's individual claim, they would see more clearly the
nature of their predicament upon review at his instance. Whenever
the neighboring challenger's claim to individual protection is weakest,
his role and the role of the courts becomes one of a guardian of the
public interest. If the courts saw this, they might find it easier to
discern what they are best able to accomplish in that role. Certainly
it is not their function to review the merits of an honest judgment on
59 See, e.g., Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass.
427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949) ; Ratner v. City of Richmond, 201 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. App.

1964).
60 The distinction, however, might be used by the courts in applying a "security
for costs" provision. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
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the part of local authorities. Courts are entitled, however, to seek
assurance that the judgment was rational and honest, and it is this
that has driven them to a consideration of the intrinsic merits of the
action taken. But an action that does not evoke any serious sympathy
for the interests of the private challenger is also the action that leaves
the court with nothing to rest on for a determination of its intrinsic
merits. This, I have said, is the secret of Eves.61
In a case like Eves, courts have a number of alternatives open
to them.
(a) There is the alternative the court took in Eves itself-to call
on the planner for help. What the court did not realize was that the
kind of help it wanted was not available, both as a matter of practical
politics on the local level, and, I think, as a matter of the planning art
itself. It is enough to say here that what the court needed was a set
of planning principles from which it copld tell whether the approval
or disapproval of a particular location for industry was a proper choice
among a number of otherwise proper locations, when the other locations were by definition unknown. Needless to say the court did not
get what it wanted.
The point is that if a court were to react to planned unit development the way it reacted to the floating industrial district in Eves, the
planner could not supply what the court would be looking for. The
court would be calling for the planner's help because the regulations
applicable to planned unit development include a discretionary step
that might, for all the court knows, involve less than an honest judgment concerning the best interests of the community. Planning principles could be adopted in advance of the particular application for
development that would exclude that possibility. But these, I suspect,
would need to be as complex as the automatic regulations that we are
trying to avoid-or nearly so. It will help to reveal the reasons for
my suspicion if we consider how the recent Federal Housing Administration's Land Use Intensity Rating system 62 might serve as a set
of planning principles of this sort.
First, how would the proper land use intensity rating be assigned
to the project? One way to do it would be to assign ratings to various
districts in the community in advance of the presentation of any
project. But this is open to the objection that to divide the residential
areas of the community into districts and to assign different ratings
to each is to resurrect in part the old thinking that proper densities are
absolutes, which need not respond to the location and characteristics
61 See text accompanying notes 44-54 supra.
62 See Hanke, Planned Unit Developmeint and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 15, 22-30 (1965) ; notes 63-66 infra.
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of a particular site or to the design and character of the proposed
dwellings. An interesting solution to this problem, suggested by Mr.
I-anke, would be to assign ratings on an isobaric basis (similar to the
elevation rings on a map), thus leaving a range of ratings available
within each ring. To allow for sound differentiation as to each specific project, however, the range left open within each ring may have
to be fairly substantial. Therefore, if the specific intensity rating
comes to be assigned only at the time when a particular project is
being proposed, the FHA standards for doing this might not satisfy
those courts that are disposed to view with suspicion any exercise of
administrative discretion in zoning. 3 Thus the FHA rating system
may have to be complicated by additional standards.
Let us assume, however, that intensity ratings are assigned as an
original districting matter-as was done in the Frederick County,
63
The FHA, MINIMUM PROPERTY STANDARDS FOR MULTIFAMILY HOUSING No.
2600 (1963), introduces the rating system with the following language: "The land-use
intensity . . . shall be appropriate to the characteristics of the site and its location
in the anticipated community pattern." Id. §M301-1. Instructions for assigning

the appropriate rating are found in FHA, INSTRUCrIoNs FOR LAND-UsE INTENSITY
FORMS (1965). The Instrictions prescribe a series of steps, each one designed to

narrow the range of intensity available for the proposed project until an intensity
rating is reached for the site in question. In Step 1, the analyst is instructed to
arrive at a broad range of intensity appropriate for the "segment of the community
in which the specific site is located." In Step 2, the range is narrowed for the
site by reference to the building types "common" in the "neighborhood." In Step 3,
the range is further narrowed by reference to the "existing densities in the neighborhood." In Step 4, the range is further narrowed by comparing the range so far
established with the intensity rating of "benchmark projects'-successful projects
completed in similar localities elsewhere. In Step 5, the rating for the project is
tentatively selected. The instructions then describe two ways of "testing" the selected
rating. Unless I am mistaken, the first is not so much a "test" for the selected rating
as it is a systematic list of the required characteristics of the project, given the
selected rating and the proposed building type. See Hanke, supra note 62, Form 1028,
Figure 10, at 45. This, presumably, gives the analyst an idea what the project might
look like if the selected rating is assigned to the site. What he "tests" this idea
against, I am not sure. I think the real test is the second test prescribed by the
instructions, which requires the analyst to determine whether the selected rating
"will permit a practical planned-unit development project that will find ready public
acceptance and a good market" This last test, obviously a critical one for the FHA,
will involve employing expertise in the real estate market (which, as everyone knows,
is a combination of solid experience coupled with a certain amount of wild guessing).
In my brief description of the FHA Instructions for selecting appropriate ratings, I
may have overemphasized that element in them which suggests that they merely provide a convenient method for rationalizing the status quo. Certainly that element is
present, and the FHA Instructions have been criticized for it. At the Annual Conference of the American Institute of Planners in 1964, Roy Potter, Planning Director
of Fremont, California, had this to say:
this approach only extends the status quo. Under the Land Intensity Ratio
rating, new towns which have adopted plans . . . cannot rise in status to
. It must be
much more than a low-density residential slurb [sic?]. . .

inferred that these new communities must remain semi-cities, waiting for
redevelopment in the future when additional federal funds can be legally
granted for what should have been built in the first place ...
I must leave the reader to judge for himself whether these charges are valid on
consideration of the FHA Instructions in full. One thing is clear, however. The
FHA Instructions do not provide very concrete guidance for the selection of an
appropriate rating except when they are interpreted as calling for a mere extension
of the status quo.
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Maryland Ordinance.64 Would the local authority allow the developer
to put up any housing types or any combination of housing types so
long as the prescribed ratios (on the rating scale) "5 were met? Of
course not. Even the FHA does not contemplate this.66 And the
FHA is interested only in the internalimpact of the developer's choices
-that is, in the effect of his choices on the marketability of the homes
within the development (unless, of course, it carries the insurance on
adjacent developments). Local planning authorities, on the contrary,
are primarily interested in the external impact. Of course, the courts
would also be interested in the external impact if what they are called
upon to determine is whether a decision to approve will serve the interests of the community at large. In order to adopt planning principles
which would satisfy the courts fully on this score, the principles would
have to include provisions that would explain in each case why a particular housing type or combination of housing types was or was not
approved. Such principles would, I suggest, be as complex as the
regulations that we are trying to avoid. As we have noted, complex regulations would not be adopted locally-at least in the suburbs
-and complex planning principles would meet the same fate. So, when
faced with discretionary approval of planned unit development, if the
courts should call on the planner for help, they would find that there
are limits to what the planner can do here, as in cases such as Eves.
7
The Pennsylvania courts have, I think, discovered this already.
See Hanke, supra note 62, at 31-34 (appendix).
65 See id. at 41.
66
The FHA clearly reserves the right to refuse approval to a proposed housing
type or combination of housing types under the "public acceptance and a good
market" test described in note 63 .rupra. Indeed, the FHA Instructions for arriving at the appropriate intensity rating for the site suggest strongly that the rating
is determined by reference to what the FHA believes to be the most marketable
housing type. See description of Step 2, note 63 supra. Step 2 states that "when
more than one building type is appropriate for the proposed site, the land area way
be divided on a percentage basis for each of several land-uses or building types.
Each part of the land area is then considered separately . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Later portions of the Instructions suggest that the "may" was really intended as a
"shall" for it is later stated that
where separate site areas for varied building types have been analyzed . . .
a separate LUI number is determined . . . for each site area. A combined
LUI number is also found for the total area. To find the combined LUI
number, add the maximum floor areas for the separate site areas and divide
the resulting total floor area by the total land area. . . . At the discretion
of the Chief Underwriter, FHA gives the Sponsor an LUI number for each
site area or the combined LUI number.
As I read these Instructions, they suggest the following: (a) FHA still believes
that the most marketable project is the one confined to a single housing type-preferably the type prevalent in the "neighborhood"; (b) If several housing types are
envisaged, these are assumed best distributed in discrete sections of the project.
The Instructions suggest to me that FHA entertains substantial doubts about the
marketability of a "mix"--hence all of the obvious ambiguities of the above quoted
portions.
67 See note 68 infra.
64
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This brings me to the second alternative which the courts
might take.
(b) Courts might simply stop worrying about whether a relaxation of regulations represents a rational and honest judgment on the
part of local authorities so long as nobody is individually and seriously
injured thereby. They might go back to the old standby developed
in the direct challenge cases, which is to balance a presumption of
validity against the challenger's loss. I think the Pennsylvania court
has moved in this direction in a series of cases since Eves. 8 The New
York court took that view years ago."9
There is another alternative.
(c) It is time that we re-examined our belief that planning controls are capable of recognizing Cinderella by fashioning a shoe for her
sight unseen, or more accurately, if I may be pardoned such levity, site
unseen. To get better quality residential developments, planning controls must be capable of adjusting sensitively to the particular site and
and to the particular demand for housing existing at the time of development. To make this possible, the courts must abandon the idea that
the only way to guarantee honest and impartial planning administration is to limit all progress to crude categories. Moreover, the courts
cannot rely entirely on the planner for such a guarantee.
I am not suggesting, however, that the courts need give up. If
sensitive adjustments make it hard for the courts to judge the honesty
of the decisions made by the merits, surely something ought to be done
to strengthen the procedures so as to allow the courts at least to determine whether the conditions for rational and impartial decision making
were present. In this respect, our system is totally inadequate. If a
record is made, it is frequently a collection of miscellanea that contains everything but the kitchen sink. Evidence is excluded that ought
to be included and vice versa. If findings are made and conclusions
6

8

Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964) ; Donahue v.

Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963) ; Pumo v. Borough of
Norristown, 404 Pa. 475, 172 A.2d 828 (1961) (discussed at note 46 supra). A case
frequently mentioned in conjunction with these is Key Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408
Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962). Although Key foreshadowed the court's adoption of a
diluted version of the "comprehensive plan" requirement, it was a case where the
local authority had rezoned to exclude the plaintiff's proposed use and was, therefore,
a case dealing with the "No" side of zoning rather than the "Yes" side. For the
implications of this distinction, see text at notes 42-54 supra. A much more significant
case was Cheltenham Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964), which
involved a two-step rezoning for a planned unit (apartment and shopping center
complex). The lower court held the rezoning invalid citing Eves. The supreme
court held in favor of the developer on the ground that plaintiff (a civic association)
stood by while the developer proceeded to construct the early sections of the development and was therefore estopped. The opinion of the court carefully refrains from
reaching the Eves issue-therein lies its significance.
09See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951),
discussed in note 49 supra.
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stated, it is frequently impossible to relate the findings to the record
or the conclusions to either. That the courts have permitted this state
of affairs to continue is, I think, understandable. Of the decisions
traditionally left to administrative agencies, the courts would not come
across many that were both favorable to the applicant and would not
yield to review by simple appearances.70 Now matters are changing,1
and the courts should realize that they cannot judge favorable administrative action by appearances alone. It is true that insisting on more
decorous local procedures and a better record may not make the courts
any the wiser on the merits of the controversy. But would they not
feel more comfortable if there was evidence that local officials charged
with dispensing this wisdom had all of the facts before them and made
an effort to relate their conclusions to the facts? 72
There is still another problem. Because of the current statutory
limitations on the administrative function, many of the items for decision in a planned unit development may have to be left to the legislative body. Here there will be no record, no findings of fact, and no
conclusions for the courts to review.7 3 If we are to have a better
system for making sensitive adjustments to the particular site and the
particular housing needs existing at the time development occurs, the
way to begin is to work out a better procedural setting for all those
adjustments that are best left to final determination at the time the
project proposal is presented.
Some Practical Problems for Planned Unit Development
In the introductory part of this paper, I noted a number of practical problems that must be solved if planned unit development is to be
70 The decision that is most likely to have these characteristics is the grant of a
special exception, and in these cases the courts have shown signs of concern for their
ability to review. The Illinois court warned that it would not countenance "unlimited
application of the special use technique to land uses that can readily be accommodated
within the customary categories." Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 I1l. 2d 181,
185, 166 N.E.2d 601, 604 (1960). The reasoning seems to be that the special exception technique must not be allowed to make inroads on the salutory principle that
all progress must be by crude categories or we are lost. Perhaps my translation of
what the court intended to say is unfair but, in any event the point is that until
recently local authorities showed no disposition to make such inroads through the
special exception technique.
71 See, e.g., Summ v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Ridgefield, 150 Conn. 79, 186
A.2d 160 (1962); Huff v. Board of Appeals of Baltimore County, 211 Md. 48, 133
A.2d 83 (1957).
72 It is interesting to note that Connecticut has adopted a unique provision requiring that all evidence presented before the zoning commission and the board of appeals
be recorded either stenographically or by a sound recording device. CoNiq. GEN.
STAT. § 8-7a (1958).
That requirement, I would suggest, has a good deal to do with
the favorable attitude of the Connecticut court towards flexible development control.
See, e.g., Summ v. Zoning Comm'n of Town of Ridgefield, sipra note 71.
73 The reaction of the Eves court is worth noting. See text accompanying notes
52-54 supra.
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encouraged.
detail.

At this point I want to discuss some of them in greater

Project Approval. Approval of a project by the local public
authorities should involve a simple unified procedure before a single
agency authorized to pass upon all of the elements of the project. The
draftsmen of our early enabling legislation, as I noted, did not overlook the need for such a procedure, and, in fact, incorporated it in section 12 of the model planning law of 1925.7 Under section 12, the
local legislative body could extend to its planning board the power to
approve subdivision plans "indicating lots where group houses for
residence or apartment houses or local stores and shops are proposed
to be built." Section 12 went on to make clear that "[s]uch plan, if
approved by the planning board, shall modify, change or supplement
the zoning regulations of the land shown on the plat." Two general
standards were provided for the guidance of the board. First, "there
shall be no greater average density of population or cover of the land
with buildings than is permitted in the district wherein such land lies";
second, that no such plan shall be approved by the board "unless in its
judgment the appropriate use of adjoining land is reasonably safeguarded and such plan is consistent with public welfare."
The draftsmen's discussion of section 12 leaves no doubt as to
what was intended. The provision, says Bassett, would
allow the developer to suggest, for instance, the location of a
suitable business district on his plat. Perhaps he will want to
surround it with a buffer multi-family house district. This
balancing of street locations and widths, plazas and small
parks, and zoning interchanges can best be made by the
developer.75
Nor is there any suggestion in section 12, or in the contemporary discussion of it, that the planning board would have no power to act on
a proposal unless every detail of it conforms to standards set forth by
the legislative body in advance. Section 12 was incorporated verbatim
into the New York planning legislation in 1926 and 1927. Although
section 12 was adopted without change only in New York 7 and
74

See text accompanying note 4 supra.
REGIONAL SURVEY OF NEW YORK AND ITS ENVIRONS, LAWS OF PLANNING

75 7

UNBUILT AREAs Part II, 295 (1929).
10 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 690; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 719; N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1927, ch. 175. It became N.Y. GENERAL CITY LAW § 37; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 179-p; N.Y. TowN LAW § 281. Because these provisions have recently been amended,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 963, in response to the decision in Hiscox v. Levine, 31
Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1961). I shall refer to the original act
as "section 12."
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Indiana, 7 its significance is not confined to those states. The very
fact that a provision of this sort was conceived by the men who are
responsible for most of our planning legislation challenges us to reconsider the interpretation that we have been giving to that legislation.
For section 12 not only reveals that Bassett, Williams and others were
aware of project residential development, it also reveals that these
men, otherwise so careful to meet the demands of the Constitution as
they read it, saw no serious objection to a provision that would enable
the planning board to pass on all matters presented, including the location, design, and distribution of different housing types and of "local
stores and shops" 1s upon the site.
I have had occasion to note earlier that this provision remained
in the New York laws virtually unnoticed for over thirty years. The
simple explanation of this neglect is that the provision was written
years in advance of the time when developers or local authorities were
ready to experiment with such a concept of residential development.
Although section 12 was ahead of its time, it did not solve all the
problems that concern a developer today. For example, section 12
made no provision for handling the development of the larger project
by stages. On the contrary, it provided that the power to approve
the project was to be exercised "simultaneously with the approval of"
the final subdivision plat. On the one hand the developer could not
obtain approval for the entire project without filing a final subdivision
plat for the whole site 7 9 --something he could not afford to do for
the larger project. On the other hand, the planning board might well
have doubted that it had the power to approve a portion of the project
because section 12 contained no authority or procedure for considering
the rest of the project at the same time.
Moreover, there was a fundamental defect in the philosophy of
section 12: the assumption that densities established for lot by lot
development are appropriate for project development. Any enabling
legislation or any local ordinance that assumes there will be no increase
in density, will automatically limit planned residential development to
occasional clustering of the single housing type already allowed under
the standard district regulations. We cannot afford to overlook the
fact that, for most developers, planned unit development represents a
way of persuading local authorities to some relaxation of the exclu77 Indiana adopted the provision in 1951. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-756(7) (1964)
(added by Ind. Laws 1951 ch. 297, § 1).
78 It is significant that the 1963 amendment of Town Law § 281 (N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 963) specifically limits the device to residential uses.
79 For recent changes in New York, allowing for section by section recording
of a finally approved plat and section by section bonding of subdivision improvements,
see note 129 infra.
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sionary densities now prevailing throughout the suburbs. So far as
I am concerned, this would be a desirable by-product of a new approach
to residential development, not only from the planning but from the
social point of view.
Section 12 received its first and only test in the courts to date in
Hiscox v. Levine. 0 The developer, proceeding under section 12, enacted as section 281 of New York Town Law (as it was before amendment), presented to the planning board a subdivision plat under which
he proposed to cluster the single family detached homes already allowed
in the district on lots of one half acre, rather than on lots of one acre
as required by existing district regulations. He proposed to dedicate
the balance of the tract for a public park. Six years prior to his application, the local legislative body had passed a resolution authorizing
the planning board to exercise the powers provided for under section
281 of the Town Law. The resolution was brief and confined itself
to a simple directive: "maint[ain] [the] average density of population," and, in all respects, proceed in "strict conformity with § 281 of
the Town Law." 11
Acting under this authorization, the planning board approved the
developer's plat and deed of dedication for the park. The action was
challenged by neighbors. There was some support for their argument
that the number of dwelling units the developer proposed to build under
the duster plan exceeded the number of dwelling units that he could
have built had the one acre minimum lot size been preserved 2 In
holding the board's action invalid, however, the court paid no attention
to this point. Rather, the court decided that the action of the board
allowing reductions in the prescribed lot size on so large a tract (one
hundred acres in all), "encroaches on the legislative authority to make
zoning changes (section 265 of the Town Law) [and so] . . .cannot

be upheld." I As a makeweight, the court added that section 281
of the Town Law did not permit the area dedicated or set aside for
open space to be counted in computing the average density that is to
be maintained on the balance of the tract8 4 On both points the court's
8031 Misc. 2d 151, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
81

Id at 153, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
82The gross acreage involved was 100.8. The developer proposed to dedicate
37.5 acres of this for a park. On the remaining 63.4 acres he planned to build 79
dwelling units. It is possible that 100.8 acres would not have accommodated 79 units
at a one acre minimum. The builder must allow approximately 20-25% of the gross
acreage for streets, depending upon the site plan and topography. In addition, it is
not always possible or practical to develop all of the remaining land in exact units
of one acre.
83 31 Misc. 2d at 154, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
84Id. at 155, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 806-07.
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construction flies in the face of the language and history of the
statute.85
In most states, of course, statutory support for attempting to
consolidate the approval of a planned unit development in the hands
of a single agency is slight. Nowhere, perhaps, is it slighter than in
New Jersey. It is interesting to note that in 1930 the New Jersey
legislature did adopt Bassett's model planning law, including section
12.86 But in the process of adoption, section 12 was materially altered.
Instead of allowing the planning board to approve the plan of development, the New Jersey version left it with only the power to recommend approval to the governing body. The cautious view taken of
the powers of the planning board in New Jersey extended also to the
powers of the board of adjustment. Except for a brief period, the
New Jersey statutes have taken a restrictive view of the board's power
to grant variances.8 7

The 1953 revision 8 8 of the New Jersey laws

further tightened the scope of the administrative functions. What remained of Bassett's section 12 was dropped. A provision was added
which suggests that the planning board cannot make any determinations that involve lot sizes,89 creating doubt whether the planning board
can be permitted to administer a simple cluster ordinance. That doubt
has not been dispelled by the New Jersey courts. In Swiming River,"0
for example, the court suggests that the power to grant reductions in
lot sizes, though limited to a definite schedule set forth in the governing
ordinance, is a "special exception" power which cannot be given to
the planning board but belongs exclusively to the board of adjustment.
8
5 It is possible the court believed that its narrow reading of § 281 was constitutionally compelled. If so, it did not articulate this thought. Indeed, there is little
authority to support it. It has been held that the separation of powers doctrine does
not prevent a state legislature from delegating authority over local matters to any
appropriate local agency. As one court stated "[J]ust how much power is granted
by a particular statute is a question of statutory construction . . . not a constitutional
question." Baltimore County v. Missouri Realty, Inc., 219 Md. 155, 162, 148 A.2d
424, 428 (1959). The authorities are reviewed in LEAL AspEcTs OF PLANNED UNrr
REsiDmETiAL DEVELOPMENT § 3.3.
Constitutional doctrines, I would suggest, have very little to do with the tendency
to construe narrowly the powers of local administrative agencies. Nonetheless, the
tendency will persist both so long as the courts fail to reexamine their fear of
progress by sensitive adjustment to particular conditions and so long as they fail to
identify and weigh the interests that ought to be protected. In Hiscox, there was
no indication why the neighboring owners were complaining. But the principal
plaintiff was a private club, and I am tempted to suggest that the concern was for
the "tone" of the neighborhood.
86 N.J. Laws 1930, ch. 235, § 18, repealed, New Jersey Municipal Planning Act
of 1953, N.J. Laws 1953, ch. 433, § 28.
87See N.J. Laws 1928, ch. 274, § 9; N.J. Laws 1948, ch. 305, § 6; N.J. Laws
1949, ch. 242, § 1; and N.J. Laws 1953, ch. 288, § 1 for the history of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55-39d (Supp. 1964).
88 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.1-36.2 (Supp. 1964).
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.15 (Supp. 1964).
9
0Swimming River Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Borough of New Shrewsbury,
30 N.J. 132, 152 A2d 135 (1959).
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The court, however, had previously recognized that the planning
board has special competence in site planning matters and that the
line between site planning and decisions affecting uses and structures
is sufficiently flexible to respond to the exigencies of the situation. 1
Swimming River, moreover, did not involve cluster development. The
court there was dealing with an ordinance that- sought to make
scheduled reductions available on an individual lot basis."2 Surely,
decisions as to lot size, when set in the context of subdivision plan
approval, can readily be characterized as "site planning" decisions.
Indeed, this appears to have been the view of the lower New Jersey
court in Chrinko9 3 when it approved a cluster procedure that utilized
the planning board (although Swimming River was not cited). But
if there remains a question whether the planning board can be authorized to exercise discretion as to lot size-even when the range of
this discretion is confined to a definite schedule set forth in the original
ordinance-one cannot speak encouragingly of the chances that New
Jersey courts would approve planning board discretion on such
matters as the number, location, and distribution of various housing
types. The conclusion that these are matters for the board .of adjustment is equally untenable. The idea that the board should perform a
significant function in planned unit residential development has to be
rejected, both because it has no support in history and because it is
wholly impractical. How would the planned unit development procedure work when the site plan has to be approved by the planning
board and the distribution of the housing on the site has to be approved
by the board of adjustment? When one is dealing with planned unit
development, distinctions between site planning powers, special exception powers and legislative powers are untenable unless one is prepared
to deny the "unit" characteristics of the project. Bassett and others
recognized this when they drafted section 12 of the model planning
law of 1925. That section 12 was not more widely adopted is due to
the fact that few legislatures sensed the need for it in the late twenties.
But Bassett did not give up his idea. In the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act of 1928 11 he included some provisions which, if read
carefully, can do most of the job done by section 12. For instance, in
91

Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 186, 131 A.2d 1, 18 (1957).
92 The board was given the power to offer reductions for any "subdivision,"
Swimming River Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Borough of New Shrewsbury, 30
N.J. 132, 152 A.2d 135 (1959). The Municipal Planning Act defines "subdivision"
as any division of a lot or tract into two or more lots: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.2
(Supp. 1964).
WChrinko v. South Brunswick Township Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187
A.2d 221 (Super. Ct. 1963).
94 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928).
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section 15 of the 1928 act Bassett inserted a paragraph which provides
(as part of the subdivision approval function) that the planning board
shall have the power to agree with the applicant upon use,
height, area or bulk requirements or restrictions governing
buildings and premises within the subdivision, provided such
requirements or restrictions do not authorize the violation of
the then effective zoning ordinance of the municipality ...
Will this do the job of section 12? Certainly it will, if the zoning
ordinance is silent on the details and is confined to setting out the
broad limits within which the planning board's discretion must operate.
Furthermore, Bassett envisaged that the ordinance would be silent on
the details. In section 14 of the 1928 act, he demanded that the planning board adopt subdivision regulations as a condition of the exercise
of its powers, and he provided that:
Such regulations may provide for the proper arrangement of
streets . . . for adequate and convenient open spaces for

traffic, utilities, access of fire-fighting apparatus, recreation,
light and air, and for the avoidance of congestion of population, including minimum width and area of lots. (Emphasis
added.)
Clearly then, Bassett anticipated that the zoning ordinance would not
prescribe lot sizes. Nor can this provision be read to require the
board to adopt regulations which leave no room for substantial adjustments when the subdivision plan is presented. Otherwise, the provision allowing agreement on "use, height, area and bulk requirements"
in the next section, section 15, would become nonsensical.
Many lawyers and public officials, I suspect, are unaware that both
sections 14 and 15 are in force in at least six statesf 5 Moreover, a
large number of states that did not adopt section 15, did adopt
section 14.9" Section 15, of course, is particularly helpful in supporting
an approach to planned unit development entirely through the planning
board. It is possible, however, that section 14 alone may be sufficient,
because the subject matter which the board is authorized to cover by
95 ALA. CODE tit. 37, §§ 798, 799 (1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-14, -15
(1961); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.87-.88 (1963) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 26-27
(1957); MicH. Comp. LAws, §§ 5.3004-.3005 (1958); N.M. STAT. ANN., §§ 14-2-25
(1954).
9

6ALAsEA STAT. §40.15.090 (1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-747 (1963); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1111 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. § 33:112 (1950); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 11-3843, 3844 (Supp. 1965) ; N.H. REV. STAT. AN. § 36:21 (1955);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-48-20 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.09 (Page 1953);
OR. REv. STAT. § 92.044 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22770 (1957) (only for
cities of the second class-in effect, Pittsburgh) ; P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955) ;
RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-23-6 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE § 58.16.110 (1961); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 525 (1961).
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its own subdivision regulations is extremely broad 7 The problem, of
course, is that planned unit development is far more difficult in any
state whose enabling laws have no specific provisions which might support an argument that the planning board may perform more than
a bare site planning function. In those states, there are the following
alternatives: (1) the courts must be prepared to read the enabling
legislation more expansively, or (2) planned unit development will
have to be wholly preregulated (leaving no discretion to the planning
board except on pure site planning matters), or (3) planned unit
development will be exposed to a patchwork procedure, involving both
the planning board and the local legislative body, and perhaps even
the board of adjustment.
Hearings. A requirement that the approval of more than one
agency is necessary is not calculated to encourage planned unit development, particularly if the developer will be forced through several public
hearings before he can complete his project. The problem of repetitious hearings, however, is not confined to planned unit development.
Existing enabling legislation emphasizes the distinction between
zoning and subdivision control by requiring that public hearings be held
on each,"8 although Bassett and others recognized that the distinction
could not be maintained when applied to the larger project.9" The
assumption, of course, is that the legislative zoning function will be
exhausted long before the developer arrives on the scene, leaving only
site planning questions to be determined on consideration of his specific proposal. When this assumption proves false, as it often does, 00
the developer will have to present his proposal at a public hearing for
a rezoning. After obtaining the necessary rezoning, he may then be
shunted to the planning board for further hearings on each subdivision
approval. Local governing bodies frequently favor further hearings
97

Although Pittsburgh did not appear to rely upon § 14 in establishing its
planned unit districts, see Craig, Planned Unit Development As Seen From City Hall,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 127, 130-32 (1965), it is interesting to note that it is the only
political subdivision of the state that has this provision-a curious reflection on the
fragmented condition of the Pennsylvania enabling legislation.
9
8 Public hearings are, of course, required on all legislative zoning changes.

This requirement goes back to § 5 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. In
addition, a substantial number of jurisdictions require public hearings on subdivision
approval. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 100.088 (1962); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3005
(1958); N.J. REv. STAT. §40.55-1.18 (Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-26
(1953); N.Y. TowN LAW §276; WASH. REV. CoDE § 58.16.050 (Supp. 1964).
99 See text accompanying notes 4, 74-77, 94-97 slpra.
100 Zoning requirements are not so much rules under which future development
will occur as they are rules under which development cannot readily occur-rules
to be bargained away against concessions by the developer when he chances along.
I think one could demonstrate that most development today does not occur under
existing zoning but rather by way of some change or relaxation in the existing zoning
undertaken as part of a bargaining process between the developer and the local
authority.
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in order to emphasize the planning board's responsibility for what
was done.
The purpose of public hearings is to afford the public notice of,
and an opportunity to object to, the proposed project. The fact that
the enabling legislation requires a public hearing on subdivision approval, in and of itself, should not be read to require that separate
hearings be held if essentially the same proposal has already been presented at a hearing on the application for rezoning. The fundamental
question is at what stage in the evolution of a specific project should
the hearings be held? It appears that the draftsmen of current enabling
legislation did not give this question enough thought.
Generally, the provision made for public hearings in the current
enabling legislation reflects an assumption that the hearings should be
held at the last hour, when the proposed project has crystallized in
every detail. Although the hearings prescribed for subdivision approval are frequently referred to as hearings which must be held
before final subdivision approval is given, the location of this reference
in the statutes strongly suggests that the hearings must be held on the
final subdivision plan.'
If this suggestion is taken seriously, the
developer who embarks on a larger project will have to face a number
of public hearings because, as I have noted, he cannot afford to proceed to final subdivision approval on the entire project at one time.
The point I am making here can be best illustrated by reference
to New Jersey, one of the few states where an attempt has been made
to revise the original procedure so as to reflect more closely the needs
of modern development. Prior to 1953, the New Jersey legislation,
in common with other legislation which had its origins in the standard
enabling acts, simply provided that final subdivision approval should be
given "after a hearing." 102 Therd was no provision for tentative
approval, as there was none in the standard acts. It is clear that an
orderly process toward final approval on a larger project requires at
least one intermediate step-a presentation at which the larger lines
and more important features of the project can be settled, so that the
developer knows what will be required of him on final approval before
he embarks on further expenditures in the preparation of detailed
plans. A tentative approval procedure is now incorporated in all of
the better ordinances, and has been given recognition in a number of
enabling acts. But very few of the legislative provisions offer to the
developer any assurance that the plan as tentatively approved will be
honored by the local public authority when the time comes for final
101 See statutory provisions cited in note 98 supra.
102 NJ. Laws 1930, ch. 235, § 11, repealed, NJ. Laws 1953, ch. 433, § 18.
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approval.' 03 New Jersey was one of the first states to recognize the
importance of such an assurance, although its legislation is not without some deficiencies. 10 The New Jersey Municipal Planning Act
of 1953 carries forward the old provision that final approval must be
"after a hearing," 15 but it does not mention hearings in the new
provision that deals with tentative approval."'0
This represents something of an hiatus. If the old provision is read to require a hearing
on the final subdivision plat, the new provision makes nonsense of it
because, under the new provision, the developer is entitled to final
approval in accordance with the "general terms and conditions" established at tentative approval, for a period of three years' 07 Obviously,
if public participation is to have any meaning, it must take place at
the tentative approval stage. How the hiatus will be bridged by the
New Jersey courts is not clear, although the supreme court has intimated that the developer cannot claim the statutory protection for
tentative approval unless there has been a hearing at this stage.' 03 Does
the court mean that a second hearing may be required at final approval?
The purpose of a tentative approval procedure, as I mentioned
above, is to fix the broad outlines of the proposed project so that the
developer may know where he stands before he undertakes substantial
expenditures and commitments associated with the preparation of detailed plans. One of the reasons why developers find it necessary to
proceed to final approval for the larger project by sections is that
it enables them to limit the period during which substantial investments
in the project are carried without a return. The proposal presented
at tentative approval, therefore, cannot be required to contain all the
detail which is required at final approval, otherwise much of the purpose of a two stage (tentative-final) approval procedure is compromised. So the question whether public hearings ought to be held on
tentative or final approval (or both) is not as simple a question as
might at first appear. A fundamental question of policy is involved,
as well as technical questions which ought to be resolved by appropriate legislation. The policy question is whether the purpose of a
public hearing is fairly met by confining it to the larger lines of the
proposed project, considering the discouraging effect which repetitious
hearings (otherwise likely to result) may have on better, more ambitious forms of residential development. If the answer is that a hearing
103

See notes 124-31 infra.

104 See text accompanying notes 128-30 in!fra.
105 N.J. STAT. AN . § 40.55-1.18 (Supp. 1964).

That this reference calls for a
public hearing seems clear from N.J. STAT. AxN. § 40.55-1.7 (Supp. 1964).
106 N.J. STAT. ANx. § 40.55-1.18 (Supp. 1964).
107 Ibid.
'IS Virginia

Constr. Corp. v. Fairman, 39 N.J. 61, 187 A.2d 1 (1962).
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at tentative approval is adequate protection to the public, there remain
some further questions that ought to be resolved by legislation. If
the developer proposes modifications in the terms of the tentatively
approved plan (for example, because experience in the early stages
shows them to be necessary), should the local public authority be
allowed some leeway to approve such proposals without further public
hearings? If so, how should that discretion be defined? Suggested
answers to these questions will be found in the model enabling legislation, discussed by Richard Babcock in this symposium. I will merely
remark here that the failure of current enabling legislation to address
itself to these questions is inexcusable, considering their importance
both from the policy and practical points of view.
Development by Stages. Some of the problems associated with
the development of a larger unit by stages have already been mentioned.10 9 It is important to note that development by stages does not
so much reflect the need to time construction as it reflects the need
to time final approval. In standard development, final approval is
obtained when the subdivision plat is approved and recorded. There
is no requirement that the developer proceed to construct the homes
immediately or that he complete construction by a certain date. If he
cannot proceed to the final approval for an entire project it is not
because construction and marketing will take several years but because,
if construction and marketing will take several years, he cannot afford
the costs and consequences of obtaining final approval for the entire
project. Before final approval, he must make detailed engineering
studies and surveys, prepare the site plan (subdivision plat), and
furnish bonds for public improvements. For standard development
these are not necessarily substantial expenses. But the consequences
of obtaining final approval and recording the plat are troublesome.
In many localities the recording of a subdivision plat is the signal for
an increase in taxes--each lot being assessed separately on the basis
that it is about to be developed. More importantly, changes in the
plan of development become more difficult. Public streets shown on
the plat will have to be dedicated at the time of approval. Indeed,
under both common law and statute, the mere recording of a plat will
have this effect.11 Furthermore, the courts have been expanding the
109 See text accompanying notes 6-16 supra.

110 See, e.g., Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 Fed. 626 (6th
Cir. 1895) ; Reyerson v. City of Chicago, 247 Ill. 185, 93 N.E. 162 (1910) ; City of
Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200 (1884); Conkling v. Village of Mackinaw
City, 120 Mich. 67, 79 N.W. 6 (1899) ; Osterweil v. City of Newark, 116 N.J.L. 227,
182 At. 917 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) ; Greenberg v. L. I. Snodgrass Co., 161 Ohio
St. 351, 119 N.E2d 292 (1954) ; Snyder v. Commonwealth, 353 Pa. 504, 46 A.2d 247
(1946); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, §§ 1-2 (Supp. 1964); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 109, §3
(1952) ; OHio R . CODE AxN. §§ 711.06-.07 (Page 1953).
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doctrine that purchasers who buy lots by reference to a recorded plat
acquire rights in those areas which appear intended for common use
and enjoyment."' Thus, after the recording of a plat and certainly
after the sale of lots, the site plan may become substantially frozen
and changes in it will require both public proceedings and private
releases.
In standard development, the factors that force the developer to
proceed to final approval of the larger project by stages present few
problems of public concern. Although the developer may tender a
tentative plan for the whole project, final approval of a stage will not
be seriously affected by what is shown in the rest of the plan except
for the street patterns. This is not wholly surprising when we consider that standard development responds to planning controls which
focus on the lot, not the project.
Even in the case of a simple cluster, which merely involves a
reduction in lot size in exchange for offsetting common open space,
the situation is changed-perhaps not materially, but it is changed.
The location of the common open space ought to be related to the
whole project, not to each stage. This is true, of course, of street
patterns in standard development. But in the cluster development,
open space also controls the density.
If the density (or land use intensity) prescribed for the whole
project must be preserved within each finally approved section,
builders may be forced to distribute open space in a manner that responds more to the need for stage by stage development than to good
site planning. On the other hand, if there is no requirement that the
overall density (or land use intensity) be preserved within each finally
approved section, the developer will probably start with the higher
density portions of his project first in order to recoup his initial
investment as rapidly as possible. This is particularly true in the
full-fledged planned unit, where various housing types are involved,
since various housing types represent different potential densities.
The local authority may not be satisfied simply with the thought
that by overloading the earlier sections of his development the developer
is exhausting the density available for the whole project. It will want
some assurance that density borrowed from subsequent stages of the
project will find its way into usable open space. The fact that the
density available for the whole project is being exhausted by developIISee, e.g., Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (beach); Picconi

v. Carlin, 40 N.J. Super. 393, 123 A.d 87 (Super. Ct. 1956) (park); Weil v. Atlantic
Beach Holding Corp., 131 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Super. Ct 1954), nodified and aff'd, 285
App. Div. 1080, 139 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1955), modified and aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 20, 133 N.E.2d
505, 150 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1956) (boardwalk). Compare Coffin v. Old Orchard Dev.
Corp., 408 Pa. 487, 186 A.2d 906 (1962). See generally UtAnp
LAND INSTnTUTE,
HoMEs

ASSOCIATION

HANDBOOK

§§ 21.1-.5 (Tech. Bull. 50, 1964).
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ment in the early stages guarantees only that there will be usable open
space if the subsequent stages are completed. If development stops
for any reason, all that is assured is that there is some land left in
private hands that cannot be developed unless a certain proportion of
it is devoted to open space-and even this assurance may wear thin
with time.
It seems clear that the concern of the local authorities is based
upon a realistic fear. But when the developer proposes to exceed the
average density prescribed for the whole project with respect to any
section of development, it is unwise to require that he set aside and
locate the necessary open space immediately. On the one hand, if
development is discontinued, there is a possibility that the housing may
be in one section while the open space is in another. On the other
hand, even if development continues as projected, experience with the
earlier stages may call for substantial changes in the site plan for the
rest of the project. If some or all of the proposed open space is definitely located by deed of dedication or other recorded instrument,
relocation to accommodate a change in site plan may become difficult
because of the rights that may be implied in favor of the early purInstead, the developer should be required to provide approchasers."
priate assurance that the necessary open space will be set aside at the
proper time, whether development progresses or is discontinued, in a
location which makes the best sense in the light of the facts as they
then appear.
This assurance can be obtained with the help of a floating open
space easement. Such an easement might be employed in the following
manner: As a condition to the final approval of any section which
(taken together with prior completed sections) exceeds the density
prescribed for the whole project, the developer will be required to
execute a deed running in favor of the local public authority, giving it
the right to have a certain amount of open space located in accordance
with a tentative plan (or any subsequent modifications of it) as long
as development progresses; if development is discontinued, the developer will be required to locate the open space where it will make
the most sense in relationship to the completed sections. 13
A floating easement, an easement that is to be located in the future
in accordance with conditions prescribed in the deed, is nothing new in
the law."' Moreover, there should be no doubt today that the
112

See note 111 supra.

113The details of such a deed are discussed in LEG.
RESDENTLAL DEVELOPMENT

§ 6.3.

AsPEcTs OF PLANNED UNIr

24 260 Mass. 412, 157 N.E. 592 (1927); Cooke v.
See, e.g., Wood v. Wilson,
Wake Elec. Membership Corp., 245 N.C. 453, 96 S.E.2d 351 (1957); Salt Lake City
v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 365 (1953).
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local public authority has the power to accept and enforce such an
5
easement."
The proposed floating open space easement provides a solution
to only one problem presented by sectioned development of a planned
unit. It allows a planned unit to be developed in sections containing
different densities without prejudicing the best location for the offsetting open space.
An objection may be made that I have assumed the developer
should be allowed to carve up the planned unit in any manner that is
convenient to him and proceed to the development of any portion with
no more guarantee for the integrity of the entire project than what
is furnished by an assurance that a certain amount of open space will
be located if development is discontinued. Indeed, the thought that
development might be discontinued conflicts with the idea of the planned
unit itself-which is that all housing types and all elements of the
site plan are placed in relationship to each other so that no part of
the project can readily stand on its own. This has led to a frequent
suggestion that final approval should not be given for any section of
such a project unless completion of the whole is guaranteed by the
developer. It is important to understand where that suggestion
leads us.
Contrary to popular belief, the developer of a new residential
project does not undertake to complete it. Assurance of completion
depends partly upon the character and financial responsibility of the
developer himself and partly upon the investment he is required to
make in the project prior to final approval of any section. The level
of his investment in the project is controlled by what he is required
to do in terms of engineering work, surveys, site planning, architectural design and bonding of public improvements prior to final subdivision approval. When he requests final approval by sections, he is
asking the local public authority to let him defer some of these investments so that they may be related more closely to actual construction
and marketing. If this request raises a question of the developer's
commitment to the entire project, the public interest in completion
suggests that it ought to be denied. But the request also raises a
question of cost and of flexibility in the development plan. Suppose,
for example, that subdivision improvements such as sewers, streets,
water lines, landscaping and so forth that will have to be provided in
some future sections of the development will cost three hundred thou115 SeeUREAN LAND INSTITUTE, HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK § 21.7 (Tech.
Bull. 50, 1964); N. WILLIAms, LAND

ACQUISITION FOR OuTDOoR IECREATION-ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEmS (Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Comm'n

Rep. 16, 1962).
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sand dollars. Let us assume further that none of these improvements
are necessary to serve a current section of the development. To assure
completion of the project, however, the local authority requires the
developer to provide them immediately or, in the alternative, to bond
them. Whether he borrows to cover the cost of these improvements
or invests his own capital or obtains surety, there is added to their
cost (three hundred thousand dollars) another cost: the profit lost to
the developer on the money (if he has used his own capital) put into
the improvements during the period before he reaches the area which
they service and begins to market the homes; the interest paid to a
lender over this period (if he has borrowed the money); the cost of
the bonds (if the improvements must be bonded rather than made
immediately).
As long as expenditures on basic improvements do not come out
of interest free borrowing, a requirement that the developer make the
improvements before they are needed adds to the cost of developmentso, of course, does a requirement that he bond them. Thus, the decision to force the developer to make these investments for the entire
project involves more than a question of commitment. It may discourage planned unit development entirely. Alternatively, it may add
to the cost of housing for the consumer.
The Administration sponsored housing bill of 1964 11 contained
provisions designed to aid developers in obtaining reasonable financing
for basic improvements in the development of "new communities."
The way "new communities" was defined suggested that the program
would be confined to very large projects in the nature of new towns.
Under this program the FHA would have been authorized to insure
loans for basic improvements. But the program envisaged interest
rates up to six percent and contained other limitations and conditions.
It was not too broadly supported by the building industry-largely
because of fears that it would put smaller builders at a competitive
disadvantage. 1 7 The bill was not enacted as part of the Housing
Act of 1964, but a modified version was enacted in 1965.11" The most
important changes were designed to eliminate any suggestion that the
program was confined to large "new town" projects."
A sound
11 S. 2468, Title II, H.R. 9751, Title II, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
117 See Hearings on S. 2468 Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1096 (1964) ; Hearings on S. 1354 Be-

fore Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,

1st Sess. 395 (1965) (remarks of Perry E. Willits, President, National Association
of Home Builders, criticizing the reference to "extensive new development" in the
1965 legislation) ; see note 119 infra.
118 79 Stat 451 (1965).
119 The original bill, S. 1354, H.R. 5840, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), described
the program as one available to "extensive new developments." This language was
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program of this sort is badly needed. But financing for basic improvements at reasonable rates, or even interest free will not solve the
whole problem of section by section development. Section by section
development not only represents the need to hold costs at a minimum,
it also represents the need to retain flexibility in the plan of development so that it can respond to changing circumstances and to experience when development is extended over a substantial period of time.
A community that requires basic improvements for the whole project
to be made at one time is forgetting what such haste has done in the
past to establish conditions of blight.2"
If assurances on future sections of a project are needed, they
should, as far as practicable, be taken in the form of security rather
than in the form of actual improvement. But the question remains
whether this added cost of development is justified-indeed, whether
either form of assurance adds significantly to the certainty of completion. It should be recalled that the investment the developer is
forced to make in preparation for planned unit development-on site
planning, architectural and engineering work, market analysis, legal
and financing arrangements and so forth-is already quite considerable.
It is questionable, therefore, whether public requirements that force
upon him a greater level of investment add much to the assurance that
he will complete if he can.
My discussion so far has been confined to the question whether
the developer should be required to make or bond improvements or
set aside open space in future sections of his development. As to each
section that has been finally platted and approved, there can be little
question that the developer must provide adequate assurances that the
necessary public improvements will be made. Nor can there be any
doubt that the common areas shown on a final subdivision plat must
be definitely set aside by dedication to the public or to an appropriate
organization for the benefit of the home owners.- 2 However, when
the developer plans to make substantial improvements upon the common areas (for example, to build a swimming pool or other community facility), we again encounter problems of timing and financing.
Ideally, perhaps, these improvements should be completed before the
received with ambivalent feelings by the National Association of Home Builders.
See Hearings on S.1354 Before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 395 (1965) (remarks of Perry E. Willits, President, National Association of Home Builders). The bill was revised in committee
and the references to "extensive new developments" and to "new towns" were struck.
79 Stat. 451 (1965).
Io The evils of premature subdivision, prevalent in the twenties are discussed in
CORNICE, PREMATURE SUBDIVISION OF URBAN LANDS (1938).
12 1
URBAN LAND INsTrrUTE, HOMES AssocIAToN HANDBOOK § 1223 (Tech. Bull.
50, 1964).
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first home is sold. From the developer's point of view, the added
costs of such an early investment may be partially offset by their value
in sales promotion. Many developers, however, are hard pressed to
find the capital or to secure the necessary financing for the improvements. Therefore, they would prefer to delay until a substantial number of sales have been closed. Responsible developers recognize, of
course, that they must place in escrow an appropriate sum out of the
sale price of each home. In addition they are prepared to give their
personal assurance that the improvement will be made. From the
home purchaser's point of view, neither of these safeguards will serve
as a complete substitute for the improvement itself because there is
always the possibility that the developer will become insolvent and
that development will be discontinued before the accumulated escrow
is adequate to cover the promised improvement. On the other hand,
even if the developer furnishes the improvements before sales begin,
their presence will not guarantee the early purchasers' enjoyment
against the adverse effects of a discontinuance. Normally, adequate
maintenance requires the participation of all the homeowners in the
proposed development. Thus it remains questionable whether the
early completion of improvements adds anything to the protection of
the home purchaser which is not supplied by the escrow approach.
Moreover, the escrow approach has the definite advantage of being
less costly, and the savings, hopefully, will be passed on to the
consumer.
The timing of improvements on the common areas and the method
used to finance them involves not only the developer and the home
buyer but the mortgage lenders as well. FHA, for example, has traditionally taken the position that it will give no credence in its appraisals to off-site (neighborhood) improvements unless they are in
place and free and clear of all liens before the sale of the first home,
or unless the developer deposits in escrow an amount which is not
less than 150 percent of the FHA's estimate of their cost.' 22

Although

these requirements were established for standard residential developments, where costly off-site improvements are more likely to fall in
the essential category, there is little indication that FHA plans to
change its policy on appraisals in the planned unit context.

28

It is

122 FHA, UNDERWRITER'S HANDBOO: HoME MORTGAGES §§71706.1-.8 (1959)
(§71706.4 provides that in certain special cases the escrow need only be 100%).

FHA Forms 2606 and 2606a depict the escrow agreement.

= See FHA & VA, SUGGESTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR PLANNED-UNIT DEFHA Forms 1400-03, VA Forms 26-8200-26-8203 (1965). The forms

VELOPMENTS,

represent a suggested declaration of covenants, articles of incorporation, and by-laws
to establish a home owners' association for the maintenance of common areas. For
the most part, the documents suggested by the FHA and VA follow the model forms
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arguable that a more liberal policy-one that would make room for
the cumulative escrow arrangement, for example, at least for improvements that might be described as nonessential-would lend great
encouragement to the provision of more amenities in new residential
developments.
Assurance Against Change in the Public Requirements. Because
planned unit development demands a larger initial investment on
the part of the developer, an obvious way of encouraging such
development without restricting it to the high price range would be to
reduce the risk to which his initial investment is exposed. This can be
accomplished by extending to the developer greater assurance that the
public requirements and specifications established at the time of initial
approval of the project, or at least at the time of final approval of a
section of it, will not be subject to capricious change by the public
authority. The significance of this point cannot be overemphasized.
Presently the developer is left uncertain as to what basic subdivision
improvements will be required of him if the regulations are changed.
Contrary to popular belief, a large part of the cost of developmentindeed, of the cost of housing-depends on the specifications for basic
subdivision improvements.
Very few jurisdictions have statutory provisions designed to offer
some assurance that the local public authority will honor an approved
plan of development. Furthermore, most of these statutes are ambiguous and, therefore, fail to encourage substantial investment in
ambitious projects. In Massachusetts, for example, the statutory assurance is so framed that it remains unclear whether it extends to the
preliminary plan as well as to those sections of the project which have
been finally platted and approved. The finally platted sections are
clearly given protection for a period of five years,124 but the statute
prepared by the Urban Land Institute and published in UmnAN LAND INsTITUTE,
HOMES AssOcIATION HANDBOOK 382-402 (Tech. Bull. 50, 1964). One point of departure material to the observation made in the text is that the FHA-VA suggested
covenants, in effect, prevent the retention or creation of any liens or encumbrances
on the common areas after the sale of the first lot. FHA Form 1401, VA Form
26-8201 (covenants) Article V, §§ 1(c), 4. Thus, if the developer plans to finance
improvements on the common areas, he will have to persuade the construction lender
to confine his security to the building lots. The position taken in the forms suggests
that FHA and VA will not be satisfied with any financing method on the common
facilities which carries a risk, however slight, that the enjoyment of such facilities
might2 4 be disrupted by failure of the project.
1 MAss. Gax. LAws ch. 40A, § 7A (Supp. 1964). This provision was added
in 1963, Mass. Laws 1963, ch. 578. Earlier provisions, still on the statute books
in Massachusetts, suggest that a finally approved plat is not protected against unilateral change by the local public authority except when the developer can show
that he has "changed his position or made expenditures in reliance upon such approval,"
MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 41, §§ 81W, 81DD (1961). If these provisions continue to
have force after enactment of MASS. Gm. LAws ch. 40A, § 7A (Supp. 1964), the
developer may still be exposed to the uncertainties inherent in the common-law
estoppel concept, see note 131 infra.
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is far from clear when it attempts to extend protection to the preliminary plan. If read literally, the Massachusetts statute assures the
developer that the preliminary plan will not be affected by subsequent
changes in the zoning or subdivision requirements if a final plan,
evolved from the preliminary plan, is given approval.' 25 Read in this
way, the Massachusetts provision is not entirely nonsensical, but then
all it says is that the local authority may waive compliance with intervening changes in the requirements-not that it must do so. Nor is
this limited reading of the provision entirely fanciful. The Massachusetts statute calls for a public hearing prior to the approval of the
final ("definitive") plan. 2 ' Thus the statutory language strongly
suggests that this hearing is to be held on the final plan, which would
mean that the developer acquired no right to rely on the preliminary
plan. It may be that the ambiguities in the Massachusetts statute
have been resolved practically and sensibly on the local level, but the
matter is much too serious to be treated to a perfunctory or ambiguous
solution in the statutes. 2 7 Adequate statutory solutions must respond
to the fact that final platting of a large project is not practical from
the developer's point of view or wise from the public's point of view.
If early investment in site planning, architectural design, and
overall project improvements is to be encouraged, assurances against
change in the requirements must come before final platting-at the
tentative plan stage. The need for assurances at that stage has been
given its clearest legislative recognition in New Jersey 125 and more
recently in New York. 129 But the statutory assurance has been limited
to changes affecting lot sizes (in New Jersey, by the courts),"' and
it is available only over a period of three years or less. This period
is certainly inadequate for the larger planned unit.
125

MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A,

126 M.ASs.

GEN. LAWS ch. 41,

§ 7A (Supp. 1964).

§ 81T (Supp. 1964).

27 Much the same ambiguity is found in the Connecticut statute. It contains
two provisions, both adopted in the same year, one of which clearly extends protection
only to areas finally platted and approved. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 8-26a (Supp.
1963). The other, equally clearly, protects both the final and the tentative plan.

CoxN. GET. STAT. REv. §§ 8-28a, -28b (Supp. 1963). The inconsistency has not
been judicially resolved, unless at the local, unreported level, but two reported opinions
suggest, obiter, that the developer is entitled to no protection until final approval.
Harris v. Planning Comm'n of Town of Ridgefield, 151 Conn. 95, 100-01, 193 A.2d
499, 502 (1963); Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 314, 170 A.2d 267, 274 (1961).
The Connecticut statute does not, however, present any problem with hearings inasmuch as hearings are discretionary with the planning commission. CoNN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 8-26 (Supp. 1963).
28 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.18 (Supp. 1964).
Some deficiencies in the New
Jersey provision are discussed at text accompanying notes 102-08 .mtpra.
=2 N.Y. Towx LAW §§265-a, 276(3), 277(1).

1ao Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d

870 (1964); Levin v. Livingston Township, 35 N.J. 500, 173 A.2d 391 (1961).
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In the absence of a statute, the courts have been even more reluctant to protect the developer unless he has made very substantial
expenditures on the faith of a local approval.' 3 1 Obviously, a test
that requires the developer to venture his capital against the uncertain
chance that a court might find his outlay sufficiently "substantial" to
warrant protection is hardly designed to encourage daring.
131 See, e.g., People v. County of Cook, 206 N.E.2d 441 (Ill. Ct App. 1965);
Gramatan Hills Manor, Inc. v. Manganiello, 30 Misc. 2d 117, 213 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); York Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Brown, 74 York 197
(1960), aff'd, 407 Pa. 649, 182 A.2d 706 (1962); cases collected in McQuILLiN,
MuNicn',L CoapoRATioNs § 25.157 (3d ed. 1950). Notable exceptions are: Telimar
Homes, Inc. v. Miller, 14 App. Div. 2d 586, 218 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1961) (developer had,
however, furnished performance bonds on the entire project); Walton v. Town of
Brookhaven, 41 Misc. 2d 798, 246 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1964); see discussion of
Cheltenham Township Appeal note 68 supra.

